Edwards v Government of United States of America

Under section 91 of the Extradition Act 2003, the question is whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive in all the relevant circumstances. A genuine and legitimate dispute about an accused person’s fitness to plead or stand trial will normally be determined by the requesting state’s courts as part of the criminal process. That approach is not absolute: specific factual circumstances may justify departing from it. Medical stress, hardship or disagreement between experts does not itself require the requested court to determine the dispute. The court must apply the statutory test rather than create a heightened or separate threshold. On the evidence, extradition would neither be unjust or oppressive nor breach article 3 of the Convention.

The appellant faced extradition to the United States on securities fraud and money-laundering allegations. The District Judge sent the case to the Secretary of State, who ordered extradition. An earlier appeal was dismissed on a separate certificate issue, while the medical-condition issue was adjourned for medical evidence.

Before the Divisional Court, conflicting psychiatric evidence addressed whether the appellant had dementia, epilepsy, and sufficient capacity to participate in a trial. The central issues were whether the dispute should be remitted to the District Judge or determined by the High Court, and whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive under section 91 of the Extradition Act 2003 or incompatible with articles 3 and 8.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court accepted that there was a genuine and legitimate dispute between the medical experts concerning the appellant’s condition and fitness to plead or stand trial.
2. Applying the reasoning in Warren, such a dispute would normally be determined by the requesting state’s court as part of the trial process. That reasoning remained applicable under the Extradition Act 2003, although section 91 places the primary decision on unjustness or oppression with the court rather than the Secretary of State. The public interest in respecting extradition obligations was relevant.
3. The approach was not absolute. A specific, fact-based case might justify disapplying the usual position. No such case had been advanced. The existence of conflicting medical reports did not require the High Court to adjudicate on their merits or hear oral evidence.
4. The statutory language in section 91 remained the governing test. Consistently with Dewani, the court should consider all relevant circumstances and should not substitute a new test based on the height of the threshold or the facts of previous cases. Ordinary stress and hardship caused by extradition were insufficient.
5. Aswat was materially different because it concerned an agreed and severe mental condition, uncertainty about detention conditions and a real risk of deterioration reaching the article 3 threshold. It did not assist on the present facts.
6. It was unnecessary to decide whether section 104(1)(b), or the conditions in section 104(4)(a) and (b), permitted remittal where the District Judge had not decided the medical questions. Extradition would not be unjust or oppressive and would not remotely breach article 3.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — The medical-condition issue was considered after an earlier Divisional Court adjourned that part of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed: [2013] EWHC 1906 (Admin).
• District Judge — On 21 December 2010 the case was sent to the Secretary of State for the extradition decision.
• Secretary of State — Extradition was ordered on 22 May 2012.