VL (A Child) v Oxfordshire County Council

A local authority’s statutory power and assumption of responsibility to claim criminal injuries compensation for a child do not, without more, create a private-law duty to maximise the child’s financial position. A novel negligence duty must be assessed by foreseeability, proximity, and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose it, having regard to the statutory framework and particular facts. Where the authority’s primary focus is the child’s welfare and family rehabilitation, a duty prioritising economic recovery may be inappropriate. If a duty arose, the applicable standard for the child-care legal team would be the Bolam standard.

The claimant suffered permanent brain damage after being violently shaken by her father. A care order gave the defendant local authority parental responsibility, shared with the claimant’s mother. The authority obtained an application form for criminal injuries compensation but no claim was lodged before 1 April 1996, when a less favourable tariff scheme replaced the former scheme.

The claimant alleged that the authority negligently failed to submit a claim under the former scheme by the deadline. The authority denied any duty of care, breach, and causation. The central issues were whether a common-law duty existed, whether the child-care team fell below the applicable standard, and whether the delay caused recoverable loss.

1. The claim was novel and fell to be considered by the ordinary negligence principles identified in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, including the threefold Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 inquiry.
2. The authority had power to make a criminal injuries compensation claim, even if the mother objected, subject during the interim care order to obtaining the court’s directions. That power did not impose a tortious duty to maximise the economic position of a child in care by pursuing every available financial claim. The authority’s primary focus was the child’s physical welfare, safety, and the rebuilding of the family unit.
3. The authority’s 1992 guidance assuming responsibility for such claims was a weighty factor, but was not determinative of a private-law duty. In the circumstances, it would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty which prioritised the claimant’s financial security over family unity, or risked doing so. The alleged duty therefore did not arise.
4. If a duty had existed, the child-care team’s failure to know of the 1 April 1996 deadline would not have breached the applicable Bolam standard. The statutory changes were not adequately publicised, and the failure was not a professional failure by a reasonable competent person acting in that field.
5. If there had been a duty and breach, a claim under the former scheme would probably have succeeded. The claimant would therefore have recovered the difference between the likely former-scheme award and the award under the later scheme, applying Kitchen v Royal Air Force [1958] 1 WLR 563.
6. The claim was dismissed.