King v Secretary of State for Justice

A prisoner's residual right to associate with fellow inmates is a civil right for Article 6(1) purposes, although it remains subject to lawful disciplinary and administrative restrictions. Disciplinary proceedings resulting in cellular confinement may therefore determine that right. Article 6 does not necessarily require an institutionally independent governor at first instance. In the prison disciplinary context, fairness may be secured by the procedures governing the adjudication and by the High Court's subsequent judicial review, provided that the review has sufficient jurisdiction to examine impartiality, procedural fairness, the evidential basis of guilt and proportionality. A short period of cellular confinement will not necessarily engage Articles 3 or 8. Three days' confinement did not do so on the facts.

The claimant sought judicial review of a governor's decision finding him guilty of disobeying a lawful order under Rule 55, paragraph 25 of the Young Offender Institution Rules 2000. He was sentenced to three days' cellular confinement after admitting the charge, while subject to an ACCT plan and receiving mental-health treatment.

He argued that the proceedings determined a civil right of association, or rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and that the governor was not an independent tribunal. He also contended that judicial review could not cure the defect. The central issues were whether Article 6(1) applied and, if so, whether the proceedings as a whole provided an adequate Article 6 guarantee.

1. The claim was dismissed. The claimant retained a basic right of association with fellow inmates. Although its extent was subject to the governor's lawful discretion and to disciplinary powers, it was a personal right capable of being a civil right within the autonomous meaning of Article 6(1).

2. The disciplinary proceedings were a contestation over that civil right. Cellular confinement directly removed association with other prisoners. The connection was not tenuous or remote. The disciplinary character of the proceedings did not prevent Article 6 applying where the penalty directly affected a civil right.

3. The governor was not institutionally independent for Article 6(1) purposes. That did not determine the claim. The court had to consider the nature and subject matter of the proceedings, the manner in which the first-instance decision was reached and the content of the dispute.

4. The prison disciplinary process contained significant safeguards. The governor had to act inquisitorially and impartially, disclose the evidence, investigate the charge and reach a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court could assess impartiality, fairness, the evidential basis of guilt, proportionality and relevant circumstances, and could receive evidence for those purposes. That amounted to sufficient jurisdiction to review the proceedings as a whole.

5. The maximum period of cellular confinement was a modest interference with the custodial regime. Cellular confinement might in some circumstances engage Article 8, but three days' confinement did not reach the required level of seriousness. The judges agreed that the punishment did not engage Articles 3 or 8 in this case. Mr King's individual challenge was therefore dismissed.