Rawnsley, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board for England and Wales

A Parole Board must apply the statutory release test, but no particular formula is required. Its reasons need explain clearly why release was refused; they need not reproduce every factor or its detailed thought process. A decision may be irrational where an evidential error causes the Board to close off a realistic release option, such as approved premises, without assessing whether the prisoner’s risks could be managed there. A represented party will rarely establish that the Board should have adjourned to obtain further evidence where no adjournment was requested. Judicial intervention based on inadequate material under article 5(4) of the Convention is reserved for extreme cases.

The claimant, a prisoner serving an imprisonment for public protection sentence beyond his tariff expiry date, challenged the Parole Board’s refusal to direct his release on licence. The Board recommended transfer to open conditions because it considered that testing and consolidation remained necessary. The claimant alleged an error of law, inadequate reasons, irrationality, failure to adjourn for further information, and breach of article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The central issues were whether the Board had applied the statutory release test, whether its reasons were sufficient, whether it had irrationally failed to consider release to approved premises, and whether the absence of a further assessment required an adjournment or rendered the proceedings unfair.

1. Statutory test. Under section 28(6)(b) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, as applied to an IPP prisoner through sections 28(1A) and 34(1) and (2)(d), release could be directed only if the Board was satisfied that confinement was no longer necessary for public protection. The Board’s reference to risk being reduced to a level less than minimal was problematic, but did not clearly demonstrate that it had applied an unlawful test. No particular formula was required.
2. Reasons. Under rule 20 of the Parole Board Rules 2004, the Board had to explain why release was refused. It did not need to set out its detailed thought processes or mention every factor. The explanation that testing and consolidation in open conditions were required sufficiently conveyed the why of the decision.
3. Irrationality. The Board had misunderstood evidence that approved premises were plentiful and could be arranged promptly. It consequently failed to investigate whether release subject to residence as directed by the Probation Service would appropriately balance risk and benefit. Moving directly from uncertainty about the parental home to continued imprisonment, without considering approved premises, was irrational. The decision could not stand.
4. Adjournment and article 5(4). A represented party who had not requested an adjournment to obtain further information could succeed on that complaint only in highly exceptional circumstances. None existed. The adequacy of the material was primarily for the Board, and court intervention under article 5(4) for inadequate material was justified only in an extreme case.
5. The Board’s decision was quashed and the matter remitted for rehearing before a differently constituted panel.

The judgment records that the claim for judicial review was issued on 9 July 2010 and permission to proceed was granted on the papers on 27 August 2010. It was a first-instance decision of the Administrative Court.