Firth, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board

On an application challenging refusal of parole, the Parole Board must consider primarily the risk to the public of a further offence, including whether that risk is acceptable. Risk of reoffending and risk of harm may be assessed holistically as one overall concept. The seriousness of potential harm may properly reduce the weight given to a lower probability of reoffending. The Board must explain clearly why release is refused, but need not set out every step of its reasoning or provide an elementary appraisal of each probation officer’s view where it accepts the relevant underlying matters and reaches a different prudential judgment about their weight.

The claimant, a serving prisoner convicted of two rapes and indecent assault, challenged the Parole Board’s decision of 13 April 2010 refusing release on licence. He had behaved exceptionally well in custody, completed the available offending-behaviour programmes, and was supported for release by two probation officers subject to a robust management plan.

The Board accepted his progress but concluded that he remained at high risk of causing serious harm and that the risks were too high to be safely manageable in the community. The central issues were whether the Board had placed excessive weight on risk, failed to distinguish risk of reoffending from risk of harm, and failed to give adequate reasons.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Board’s decision not to direct release on licence was lawful.
2. The Secretary of State’s Directions required the Board to consider primarily the risk to the public of a further offence being committed when the prisoner would otherwise remain in custody, and whether that risk was acceptable. This differed from the Directions considered in R (Ross Gordon) v The Parole Board, which concerned transfer of life sentence prisoners to open conditions and imposed no equivalent requirement of primacy.
3. The Board was entitled to take a holistic view of risk. Risk of reoffending and risk of harm from a further offence could be distinguished analytically, but remained aspects of a single concept of risk. Where potential harm was especially serious, the Board could attach less weight to a low or medium probability of actual reoffending.
4. The effect of the index offences on the victim would have been immaterial as a stand-alone factor. It was nevertheless relevant as a graphic illustration of the harm that could result from reoffending.
5. The reasons were adequate. Applying the approach stated in R (Rawnsley) v The Parole Board [2010] EWHC 2689 (Admin), the Board had to communicate clearly why it could not direct release. It was not required to set out the complete chain of reasoning or to give an elementary appraisal of the probation officers’ views where it accepted the matters underlying those views but assigned them less weight.
6. The Board’s assessment was a matter of prudential judgment rather than detailed or exact analysis. Its conclusion that risk outweighed the benefits of release was sufficiently explained, even though the decision was finely balanced.