Rutherford, R (on the application of) v Independent Police Complaints Commission

A plain-clothes police officer may request a vehicle to stop at common law where there is a proper and reasonable justification, such as a genuine reasonable suspicion that it is stolen. The request does not become compulsory, and refusal is not itself an offence, merely because warning equipment is used. Lawfulness does not depend on the officer identifying, remembering or accurately stating the precise legal source of the power, provided the power existed and was justified on the facts known to the officer. Even an unlawful initial stop would not necessarily invalidate later acts carried out under separate lawful powers. The claim was therefore dismissed.

The claimant challenged the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s refusal to uphold his appeal concerning the investigation of complaints arising from his arrest and caution for assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty.

The dispute focused on whether plain-clothes officers in an unmarked vehicle had lawfully stopped the claimant’s car, whether the officers had to identify the legal power they believed they were exercising, and whether any defect in the initial stop affected the lawfulness of subsequent attempts to restrain the claimant’s brother. The court also considered the scope of the IPCC appeal and review process.

1. Claim dismissed. The IPCC was entitled to conclude that the investigation was not defective because the officers had not been asked what statutory power they thought they were using.
2. Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 did not authorise the officers to require the vehicle to stop because they were not in uniform. Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 likewise did not itself confer that stopping power.
3. At common law, however, a plain-clothes police officer may request a vehicle to stop: Steel v Goacher [1983] RTR 98. The officers had reasonable grounds for believing that the Metro was stolen. Their request was therefore justified. It was not a compulsory requirement to stop, and refusal would not have been an offence, but the claimant voluntarily stopped.
4. There was no requirement that an officer know or accurately identify the precise legal source of the power being exercised. The relevant question was whether the power existed and was justified by the officer’s knowledge and belief at the time. The court rejected the contrary submission as untenable.
5. Even if the initial stop had been unlawful, that would not automatically invalidate later conduct. Subsequent questioning, searching or restraint could be lawful under separate powers where independently justified. Any oppressive purpose might affect that justification, but no such issue arose on these facts. PC Tozer was therefore acting in the execution of his duty when the claimant assaulted him.
6. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs of £2,036.87, not enforceable without leave of the court. The interested parties were awarded £800 for acknowledgement of service costs, likewise not enforceable without leave. Permission to appeal was refused.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. Permission to appeal was refused.