Laporte & Anor v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

A public meeting organiser has a common-law power to exclude attendees whose disorderly conduct disrupts or threatens to disrupt the meeting. In an appropriate case, the power may extend to excluding the public generally and to removing persons from the building, not merely from the meeting room. The power must be exercised sparingly, and only where reasonably necessary and proportionate. Reasonable force may be used, and the police may assist the occupier. A breach of the peace is not a prerequisite to lawful physical exclusion. Where a breach of the peace has occurred, police intervention may be justified by an ongoing or imminent risk of renewed disorder, provided the action is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. Article 10 does not confer a general freedom of forum on publicly owned premises.

The claimants sought damages from the Commissioner for assault and battery, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, together with a declaration that their rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated.

They had attended a protest concerning proposed local-authority budget cuts. Protesters entered restricted parts of the civic centre, occupied the council chamber and later forced their way into a corridor leading to a staff canteen where councillors intended to reconvene. Police officers used force to remove them, and both claimants were arrested and prosecuted for assaulting officers in the execution of their duty. The central issues were whether the exclusion and use of force were lawful, whether the arrests and detention were justified, whether the prosecution was malicious, and whether the claimants’ Convention rights had been infringed.

1. Lawful exclusion. The Council had a common-law power, preserved by Local Government Act 1972, section 100A, to exclude persons whose disorderly conduct disrupted or threatened to disrupt the meeting. The power could extend beyond the meeting room to the building as a whole where that was necessary to secure the meeting’s orderly conduct.

2. The power could be exercised against all members of the public where their attendance was liable to produce disorder. It had to be used particularly sparingly and only in the absence of a reasonably viable alternative. The Council could treat the protesters as trespassers once their legitimate licence to remain had ended, and the police could lawfully assist in their removal.

3. Physical force was lawful where necessary and not excessive. A breach of the peace did not have to occur or be imminent before reasonable force could be used to exclude trespassers. The officers did not need to identify mentally the precise legal source of the power they were exercising.

4. Alternatively, a breach of the peace was occurring, or its recurrence was imminent, when the TSG officers arrived. The protesters had forced their way past officers in a confined space, creating a likelihood of harm. The relevant assessment was whether the officer’s fear of an imminent breach was reasonable in light of what he knew and perceived at the time. The intervention remained necessary, reasonable and proportionate.

5. The force used against both claimants was reasonable. Their arrests were lawful, and they were informed of the fact and reasons for arrest at the first practicable opportunity. Their detention for approximately 22 to 23 hours was not excessive.

6. The malicious-prosecution claims failed because the officers honestly believed that they had been assaulted in the execution of their duty. The Magistrates’ Court’s dismissal of the criminal charges did not establish that the officers’ evidence was incredible; it was based on the legal conclusion that the officers were not acting in the execution of their duty, without reference to Porter v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.

7. The claim under Articles 10 and 11 failed. Those provisions did not create a general right of access to publicly owned property or prevent the protection of local-government machinery from serious and deliberate disruption.

8. The claims were rejected and judgment was entered for the defendant.

First-instance decision. The judgment records that the criminal prosecutions in Haringey Magistrates’ Court collapsed after successful submissions that there was no case to answer, but no citation for that decision is stated.