Wilson- Campbell v Court of Instruction No 4, Orihuela Spain

Abuse of process in extradition proceedings exists but must be exercised with considerable care and caution. Sequential European Arrest Warrants do not, without more, establish abuse where the later warrant addresses an apparent weakness in the earlier warrant and there is no misleading conduct, improper purpose, prejudice or material delay. The court should not order further enquiries merely because one warrant has been withdrawn and replaced by another. Passage of time will bar extradition only where the statutory requirements are met, including where extradition would be unjust or oppressive or materially prejudicial. A short period associated with replacing a warrant, without evidence of prejudice or oppression, is insufficient.

The appellant appealed against District Judge Tubbs’s order of 17 August 2010 for his extradition to Spain under a European Arrest Warrant concerning alleged involvement in storing and distributing cannabis.

A first warrant had led to an extradition order before District Judge Zani. After an appeal was lodged, that warrant was withdrawn. A second warrant concerning the same conduct was then translated, certified and used for the appellant’s arrest. The appellant argued that the sequence demonstrated an abuse of process, or at least justified enquiries of the Spanish judicial authority. He also relied on delay under sections 11(1)(c) and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. The central issue was whether the replacement warrant, and the associated delay, barred extradition.

1. Appeal dismissed. The abuse of process jurisdiction in extradition cases exists, but must be exercised with considerable care and caution. The court starts from the premise that the judicial authorities of an EU member state act in good faith.
2. The two warrants were not shown to contain misrepresentations, concealment, or failures of validation that made prosecution of the second warrant improper. There was no basis for inferring that the sequence was designed to divert or delay the court, cause expense, or make it more difficult for the appellant to contest extradition.
3. The likely explanation was that the issuing authority had identified a potential weakness in the first warrant concerning the particularity of the alleged facts and had taken precautionary steps before proceeding on the second warrant. Sequential warrants of that kind were not capable of constituting abuse on the facts. No further enquiries were required. The court considered Louca v Public Prosecutor, Bielefeld, Germany, [2009] UKSC 4; [2009] 1 WLR 2550, where sequential warrants had not been treated as abusive, although the issue had not been argued.
4. The passage of time did not bar extradition under section 11(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003. There was no evidential basis for saying that the overall period since 2008 amounted to a bar, and no evidence of prejudice.
5. Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 likewise afforded no remedy. The relevant delay concerning the abuse allegation was short and was neither oppressive nor prejudicial. The appellant was granted a detailed assessment of his publicly funded costs.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the extradition order was dismissed.
• City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Tubbs ordered extradition on 17 August 2010.