Louca v A German Judicial Authority

A European arrest warrant must identify the domestic judgment, arrest warrant or other enforceable judicial decision on which it is based. The requirement in sections 2(4)(b) and 2(6)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003 does not extend to an earlier European arrest warrant, whether current or withdrawn.

The possibility that an earlier warrant might assist an abuse of process argument does not justify enlarging the prescribed information requirements. Due process safeguards elsewhere in the Act remain available without making disclosure of every previous European arrest warrant a condition of validity.

A German prosecuting authority sought the appellant’s arrest and surrender for trial on six alleged tax-evasion offences. Its European arrest warrant referred to the underlying German domestic arrest warrant but not to two earlier European arrest warrants which had been withdrawn and superseded.

A district judge rejected the appellant’s challenge. The Divisional Court dismissed his appeal in [2008] EWHC 2907 (Admin), holding that sections 2(4)(b) and 2(6)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003 concern domestic decisions underlying a European arrest warrant rather than previous European arrest warrants.

The certified question was whether “any other warrant” in those provisions means a domestic warrant on which the European arrest warrant is based.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lord Mance delivered the leading judgment, with which Lord Hope, Lord Rodger, Lord Collins and Lord Kerr agreed.

2. Part I of the Extradition Act 2003 had to be read in the context of the Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant. National legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in the light of the Framework Decision’s wording and purpose. The scheme was intended to simplify and expedite surrender between member states.

3. Article 8(1)(c) of the Framework Decision, together with the prescribed form, requires evidence of the domestic legal decision supporting the European arrest warrant. The reference to a decision “coming within the scope of Articles 1 and 2” describes the relevant prosecutorial or custodial purpose and applicable sentencing thresholds. It does not convert the underlying decision into another European arrest warrant.

4. Accordingly, the words “any other warrant” in sections 2(4)(b) and 2(6)(c) refer to a domestic warrant on which the European arrest warrant is based. They do not include an earlier European arrest warrant issued on the basis of that domestic warrant, still less one which has been withdrawn. The contrary interpretation suggested obiter in Ruiz v Central Criminal Court and adopted in Zakowski v Regional Court was wrong.

5. The possibility that information about an earlier warrant might conceivably assist an abuse of process argument did not alter the statutory construction. Neither the optional information provisions of the Framework Decision nor the criminal court’s duty to prevent abuse imposed a mandatory disclosure requirement of that kind. Due process matters were addressed comprehensively by sections 11 to 20 of the 2003 Act and by the human-rights safeguard in section 21.

6. The appellant and his advisers knew of the earlier warrants, whose withdrawal and replacement disclosed no basis for suggesting abuse. The subsisting warrant was not invalid for failing to identify them.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: Dismissed the appeal unanimously and affirmed the Divisional Court’s construction of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. Divisional Court: In [2008] EWHC 2907 (Admin) , dismissed the appeal from the district judge and held that sections 2(4)(b) and 2(6)(c) concern domestic decisions underlying a European arrest warrant.
3. District court: Senior District Judge Workman rejected the challenge to the warrant on 11 September 2008.