Ministry of Justice, Lithuania v Bucnys

A certificate issued under section 2(7) of the Extradition Act 2003 confirms only that the issuing authority has the function of issuing European arrest warrants. It does not conclusively establish that the authority is a judicial authority. That issue may be challenged at the extradition hearing.

The expression judicial authority has an autonomous and objective meaning. For conviction warrants, a ministry of justice may qualify if the person making the decision is sufficiently independent of the executive and the statutory process contains adequate judicial safeguards. Lithuania satisfied that test where courts initiated the process and the ministry acted under tightly defined rules. Estonia did not, because the ministry itself initiated and controlled the process without sufficient procedural constraints.

These were three appeals concerning conviction European arrest warrants issued by the Ministries of Justice of Lithuania and Estonia. The warrants sought the surrender of persons resident in the United Kingdom to serve outstanding custodial sentences.

The central issue was whether a ministry of justice, or an official within it, was a judicial authority under section 2(2) of the Extradition Act 2003 and article 6(1) of the Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. The court also considered whether certificates issued by SOCA under section 2(7) were conclusive.

The appeals followed decisions of District Judges, including the discharge of Bucnys on the ground that the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice was not a judicial authority.

1. SOCA certificates. The words “arrest warrants” in sections 2(7) and 2(8) of the Extradition Act 2003 referred to European arrest warrants, not domestic warrants. A SOCA certificate established only that the issuing authority had the function of issuing such warrants under the law of the requesting state. It did not certify, and was not conclusive of, the authority’s status as a judicial authority. That question could be raised at the extradition hearing itself. The court declined to follow the contrary implications in Enander v The Governor of HM Prison Brixton, [2005] EWHC 3036 (Admin), Harmatos v Office of the King’s Prosecutor in Dendermonde, Belgium, [2011] EWHC 1598 (Admin), and Howell v Deputy Attorney General, Court of Appeal of Douai, France, [2012] EWHC 150 (Admin), and preferred the approach in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority, [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin), and Dhar v National Office of the Public Prosecution Service of the Netherlands, [2012] EWHC 697 (Admin).
2. Meaning of judicial authority. The phrase in article 6(1) of the Framework Decision had an autonomous and objective meaning. The essential norm was sufficient independence from the executive for the purpose of making the judicial decision involved in issuing the warrant. Whether that norm was satisfied depended on the requesting state’s legal provisions and the way the issuing process operated in practice.
3. Conviction warrants. A ministry of justice was not institutionally incapable of being a judicial authority in relation to a conviction warrant. The antecedent enforceable conviction and sentence could provide an important safeguard, particularly where the sentencing court requested the warrant and the ministry’s role was tightly defined. The court treated conviction warrants differently from accusation warrants in this respect.
4. Lithuania. The Lithuanian Ministry of Justice was a judicial authority for the warrants issued for Bucnys and Sakalis. The relevant requests were made by courts, were based on enforceable judgments, and were governed by detailed rules. The court emphasised that the conclusion might differ where a prison or prison department initiated the process without court involvement.
5. Estonia and disposal. The Estonian Ministry of Justice was not a judicial authority. The available material showed that it initiated the process, applied merits tests, drafted the warrant, and operated without sufficiently defined procedures or functional independence. Bucnys’s appeal was allowed and the matter remitted. Sakalis’s appeal was dismissed. Lavrov’s appeal was allowed; he was to be discharged and the extradition order quashed.

The judgment describes the earlier extradition decisions but gives no neutral citation for them. Bucnys was discharged by Deputy Senior District Judge Wickham. Sakalis was ordered to be surrendered by District Judge Purdy. Lavrov’s human-rights challenge was rejected by Deputy Senior District Judge Wickham.

The High Court allowed Bucnys’s appeal and remitted the matter, dismissed Sakalis’s appeal, and allowed Lavrov’s appeal.