Artola v The 6th Section of the National High Court of Madrid, Spain

Strict compliance with the statutory requirements for a European arrest warrant does not require an unrealistically narrow reading of the warrant. The warrant must identify the domestic legal process which provides its jurisdictional foundation, but the adequacy of particulars is assessed from the totality of the information and is fact-specific. An error in a warrant valid on its face may be addressed only through the exceptional abuse of process jurisdiction, requiring a clear, undisputed and material error or omission. An EAW may itself certify that conduct falls within the European framework list under section 64(2)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003. Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain remained binding, and Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority did not impliedly depart from it.

The appellant challenged an order made by Westminster Magistrates’ Court for his extradition to Spain under a European arrest warrant. The warrant alleged that he had assisted a terrorist group by renting a safe house containing explosives and related materials. The appellant argued that the warrant failed to comply with section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, including because it referred to a Spanish “writ for an international arrest warrant” and did not identify its issuing body. He also argued that the warrant did not establish an extradition offence under section 64. The central issues were the sufficiency of the warrant’s particulars, the availability of an abuse of process challenge, and whether the warrant itself could certify a framework offence.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The reference in the warrant to a Spanish “writ” was capable of identifying a domestic legal process recognised under Spanish law as authorising steps to secure the appellant’s arrest abroad for trial in Spain. It therefore disclosed the jurisdictional fact required by section 2(4)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003 and Article 8(1)(c) of the Framework Decision. Strict construction did not require an unrealistic or artificial reading of the document.
2. The adequacy of particulars under section 2(4) had to be determined from the totality of the information. There was no universal rule that the body issuing an accusation warrant had to be separately identified in every case. The question was whether the information sufficiently met the objectives of Article 8, and that was fact-sensitive. The additional information supplied by the Spanish court could not retrospectively cure an invalid warrant, but it was relevant to the separate abuse of process issue.
3. The abuse of process jurisdiction was exceptional. It could apply where statutory particulars in a warrant were wrong or incomplete in a misleading and material respect, but the true facts had to be clear and beyond legitimate dispute. The appellant failed to establish such an abuse because the fuller facts showed that the Spanish court had ordered both his arrest and steps to secure his international arrest.
4. The original Spanish warrant contained a cross against terrorism in the framework-offences list. It therefore operated as the certificate required by section 64(2)(b). The alternative dual-criminality argument under section 64(3) did not need to be decided.
5. Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain remained binding. Although Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority recognised that the effect of Pupino had been overstated, the decisions in Dabas and Assange were capable of standing together. The court was not entitled to infer that Assange had departed from Dabas.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the extradition order was dismissed.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 13 December 2012, District Judge Zani ordered the appellant’s extradition to Spain.