SAS, R (On the Application Of) v Circuit Court In Zielona Gora

In extradition proceedings, dual criminality must be established from the conduct described in the European arrest warrant. The facts must impel the inference that the conduct would constitute an offence in the United Kingdom; it is insufficient that they merely permit that inference. A general allegation that a person drove while under the influence of alcohol does not necessarily establish unfitness to drive, even where the warrant also alleges that an accident occurred.

For warrant validity, the required particulars must appear on the face of the European arrest warrant. Later domestic warrants used to secure surrender to custody do not become particulars of the offence or the jurisdictional basis of the European arrest warrant merely because they are mentioned in further information.

Article 8 proportionality requires balancing the public interest in extradition against the interference with private and family life.

The appellants, Marek Sas and Boguslawa Sas, appealed against orders for their extradition to Poland under several European arrest warrants. Mr Sas faced conviction and accusation warrants; Mrs Sas faced one conviction warrant.

The court considered whether one allegation of driving while in a state of drunkenness satisfied dual criminality, whether conviction warrants contained the particulars required by section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, and whether extradition would be disproportionate under Article 8.

The court allowed Mrs Sas’s appeal on Article 8 grounds. Mr Sas’s appeal succeeded only on the driving allegation, on which he was discharged. His remaining challenges failed.

1. Dual criminality. The allegation that Mr Sas drove while in a state of drunkenness did not, without further factual particulars, establish conduct amounting to driving while unfit under section 4 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The facts in the warrant had to impel, rather than merely enable, the necessary inference. The separate allegation that Mr Sas had caused an accident did not make unfitness an inevitable inference. Discharge was ordered for that offence (paras [10]–[22]).
2. Validity of the warrants. Under sections 2(2)(b) and 2(6)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003, the relevant particulars were those identifying the enforceable judgment or domestic warrant forming the basis of the European arrest warrant. The court could examine only the warrant as a self-contained document. Later orders or warrants issued to secure surrender to custody were not required particulars under section 2(6)(c). The validity challenges therefore failed (paras [23]–[42]).
3. Article 8. The court applied the balancing exercise described in HH. The public interest included securing service of sentences, preventing flight from criminal justice, honouring treaty obligations and avoiding a safe haven. For Mrs Sas, the limited offence and sentence, delay, unexplained administrative delay, and serious effects on employment, housing and family life made extradition disproportionate. For Mr Sas, the seriousness and breadth of the offences and outstanding sentence meant that Article 8 did not outweigh the public interest (paras [45]–[59]).
4. Mrs Sas’s appeal was allowed and discharge ordered. Mr Sas’s appeal was rejected except in relation to the driving allegation in EAW 2, on which he was discharged.

The appellants appealed to the Administrative Court against the extradition decision of Senior District Judge Riddle dated 4 November 2014. The judgment under appeal is not given a citation in the judgment.