Raw, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Lambeth

A court ordinarily declines to determine a judicial review claim which has become academic and no longer affects the parties’ rights or obligations. It may nevertheless exercise a discretion to hear an academic public-law claim where there is a good reason in the public interest. The existence or anticipation of similar cases is relevant, particularly where the issue is likely to require resolution in the near future, but the factors identified in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Salem are examples rather than mandatory conditions.

Where a local housing authority has reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, its duty under section 184 of the Housing Act 1996 to make inquiries is absolute. A local authority cannot unilaterally avoid that duty while the statutory trigger remains. The court declined to determine the alleged policy because the claim was academic and the policy’s nature and application were insufficiently established.

The claimant sought judicial review of Lambeth’s handling of his homelessness application under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. He alleged that the Council required applicants referred to its rent deposit scheme to discontinue, or not pursue, their homelessness applications and that this avoided the Council’s statutory duties.

After proceedings began, the Council resumed its section 184 inquiries, accepted that it owed the claimant the main housing duty under section 193(2), and confirmed that he could use the rent deposit scheme. The claimant therefore obtained the practical relief sought in relation to himself. He continued to seek a general declaration concerning the alleged policy. The central issue was whether the Administrative Court should determine that academic public-law question.

1. The claim was academic. The Council had resumed its inquiries and continued to assist the claimant through the rent deposit scheme. The claimant had no remaining practical interest in the relief sought. The court therefore declined to determine the general declaration.
2. Academic public-law claims. The court applied the principles identified in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Salem: the governing question is whether there is a good reason in the public interest to hear an academic claim. The existence or anticipation of similar cases and whether the issue is fact-sensitive are relevant considerations, not rigid preconditions. The court also had regard to the risk of wasting court resources, incurring unnecessary costs and encouraging academic claims.
3. Why this claim was not heard. The evidence did not show that similar claims were likely to reach the court in the near future. The alleged policy was insufficiently defined, the Council had not explained its operation in evidence, and its legality might vary according to the applicant’s circumstances and stage in the homelessness process. The court also declined to express obiter views after refusing to adjudicate, since that could encourage further academic litigation.
4. Section 184 duty. As a general observation, section 184(1) of the Housing Act 1996 imposes an absolute duty to make necessary inquiries once the authority has reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness. The threshold is low. If the authority still has that reason to believe, it cannot unilaterally avoid continuing the inquiries. Whether conduct amounts to direct or indirect avoidance is fact-sensitive.
5. Related statutory consequences. Continuing inquiries may reveal facts triggering the interim accommodation duty under section 188(1), or later duties under sections 192 and 193. A rent deposit scheme is not necessarily an adequate substitute for those statutory benefits. The court considered the reasoning in Robinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC analogous: alternative beneficial processes may operate alongside, but cannot improperly replace or postpone, the section 184 inquiry.