Biddle & Company (a firm) v Tetra Pak Ltd & Ors

Where a claimant uses one claim form for different claims against different defendants, separate particulars of claim may be served where the claims are distinct. Particulars served against one defendant do not necessarily confine or abandon a claim against another defendant stated in the claim form.

For limitation purposes, the court must examine the claim form and pleadings in their procedural context. The addition of particulars does not introduce a new claim or cause of action if the claim against that defendant was already constituted by the claim form and had not been confined by earlier particulars. Alternatively, an amendment may be permitted where the new claim arises out of substantially the same facts, including through a permissible piggy-back amendment.

Tetra Pak brought professional-negligence and related claims concerning advice and documentation for equalisation of pension benefits. The claim form named Biddle & Company and other defendants, but the particulars initially served addressed only the actuarial defendants.

After the limitation period had expired, Tetra Pak sought to serve particulars against Biddle & Company or amend the existing particulars. The Deputy Master permitted the claim against Biddle & Company to proceed. Biddle & Company appealed, raising the permissibility of separate particulars, whether the proposed pleading introduced a new claim for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 and CPR 17.4, and whether the claims arose out of the same or substantially the same facts.

1. Separate particulars. The CPR did not prohibit separate particulars of claim against different defendants where distinct causes of action were asserted. The rules could operate consistently with that course, and the court could also direct it as part of case management. The claimant was entitled to particularise the claim against Biddle & Company separately.
2. New claim or cause of action. The claim form constituted an action founded on tort against the named defendants. Earlier particulars directed expressly against the actuarial defendants did not confine or abandon the claim against Biddle & Company. Accordingly, particularising that existing claim did not add a new claim or cause of action for the purposes of section 35 of the Limitation Act 1980 or CPR 17.4.
3. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd v Trollope & Colls (City) Ltd. The decision required a contextual assessment of the claim constituted by the writ and pleadings. It was not authority for the broader proposition that every cause of action absent from an earlier pleading was necessarily a new claim for limitation purposes.
4. Alternative basis. If the proposed pleading were a new claim, the court would permit it. The claims concerned the same equalisation subject matter and the same retainer, and the permissible “piggy-back” approach meant that claims within the limitation period could support a further amendment relating to earlier breaches arising out of substantially the same facts.
5. The separate issue concerning paragraph 7.6(b) fell away because Tetra Pak confirmed that it would not maintain that paragraph.
6. The appeal was dismissed. If necessary, Tetra Pak’s cross-appeal was allowed and the proposed amendments were permitted, subject to omission of paragraph 7.6(b).

The judgment concerned an appeal from an order of Deputy Master Smith dated 13 March 2009 permitting Tetra Pak to serve particulars of claim against Biddle & Company after expiry of the relevant limitation period. The High Court dismissed Biddle & Company’s appeal and gave alternative reasoning allowing Tetra Pak’s cross-appeal.