Laurence Pagden & Ors v Mark Robert Fry & Anor

On applications for strike out, summary judgment and amendment, a claimant must plead the essential facts and remedy supporting each cause of action. A claim appearing in a claim form but omitted from the particulars of claim is procedurally abandoned unless restored by amendment.

For limitation purposes under Limitation Act 1980, wrongdoer control does not itself engage section 32. The claimant must advance an arguable case of deliberate concealment, fraud or deliberate breach of duty, together with the facts needed to show delayed discovery. An amendment after expiry of limitation is permitted only where it adds no new claim, or the new claim arises from the same or substantially the same facts already in issue.

The judgment determined applications in three related proceedings concerning claims by companies in liquidation and their liquidators. The claims concerned alleged undervalue disposals of investments, excessive fees, accessory liability and alleged misfeasance by former liquidators.

The court considered applications to strike out or obtain summary judgment under CPR rules 3.4 and 24, an application to amend the particulars of claim under CPR rules 17.1 and 17.4, and applications concerning a protective claim issued before limitation expired. The central issues were whether viable claims had been pleaded, whether claims were time-barred, whether section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 was engaged, and whether the proposed amendments introduced new claims.

1. Strike out and summary judgment. The court proceeded on the basis that the primary facts relied on were true, but required the claimants to show a real prospect of success on limitation issues. The existing particulars of claim pleaded no viable claims against New Core 1 or New Core 2. Relief in the prayer could not substitute for missing essential facts or a pleaded cause of action. The existing knowing receipt claims against the individual Soho Defendants also failed because the pleading did not identify receipt of trust property in which the claimants retained an equitable proprietary interest.
2. Limitation. Wrongdoer control did not remove the need to establish deliberate concealment or deliberate commission of breach under section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980. The claimants had not identified the concealed facts, the relevant deliberate conduct, or when discovery occurred or could reasonably have occurred. Their reliance on the attribution principles in Burnden Holdings, Julien and Bilta did not cure that evidential deficiency. The relevant time-barred claims therefore had no real prospect of success. Clause 7.12 of the 2014 Management Deeds covered loss or damage recoverable at law, but did not make the Manager liable for claims already time-barred against the Former Manager or for an account of profits.
3. Amendments. Applying the four-stage approach in Geo-Minerals, amendments introducing new excessive-fees claims, new knowing receipt claims against New Core 1 and New Core 2, or a new intentional or reckless breach case against the Former Liquidators did not arise from the same or substantially the same facts. Those amendments were refused. Other amendments supplying particulars or arising from facts already in issue were permitted, subject to the stated excisions and limitations. The Pureleaf amendments were refused.
4. Protective claim and orders. The Protective Claim was struck out or summarily dismissed to the extent identified in the judgment. The Pureleaf claim was abandoned, and the claim against the Begbies Defendants was struck out by agreement. The particulars of claim, as amended in accordance with the judgment, were ordered to stand as the Combined Points of Claim under IR 12.11. Consequential directions and the final form of order were reserved.

First-instance decision on applications in three related proceedings. No appeal history is stated in the judgment.