W & M, R (on the application of) v Oldham Youth Court

When deciding whether a person under 18 should be committed for trial for a grave offence, the court must consider each defendant separately. It must assess whether there is a real prospect that the individual may receive a sentence of two years’ detention or more, or whether an unusual feature justifies declining Youth Court jurisdiction.

The assessment must reflect the realities of the case. Relevant matters include aggravating features, likely mitigation, possible pleas, the defendant’s age and maturity, and the prosecution case at its highest reasonable level. On judicial review, the question is whether the committing court was entitled to reach its conclusion, not what sentence the reviewing court would impose.

Two children, W and M, were charged separately with serious sexual offences involving the same four-year-old victim. On 31 July 2009, District Judge Richardson committed both defendants to the Crown Court under section 24 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980.

Both applicants sought judicial review. M argued that the District Judge had treated the decision in W’s case as determining M’s case without separate consideration. W argued that the conclusion that there was a real prospect of a sentence of two years’ detention or more was irrational. The central issues were whether each defendant required an individual venue decision and whether the committal decision concerning W was legally unreasonable.

1. M’s application succeeded. Although the offences involved the same victim and were factually linked, they were separate offences committed by separate defendants. The District Judge had effectively allowed the decision in W’s case to determine M’s venue. That was an error of law. M’s committal to the Crown Court was quashed.
2. The governing approach required separate consideration of each defendant. The policy of the youth justice system, reflected in section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and section 152(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, is to prevent offending by under-18s. Young persons should ordinarily be tried in the Youth Court, with Crown Court trial reserved for the most serious cases.
3. Following the guidance in R (on the Application of H, A and O) v the Southampton Youth Court [2005] 2 Cr App R (S), the relevant question was whether there was a real prospect, having regard to the defendant’s age, that the individual might require a sentence of two years or more, or whether an unusual feature justified declining Youth Court jurisdiction. The absence of a detention and training order for a defendant under 15 was not itself such an unusual feature.
4. “Real prospect” required a general assessment of the realities of the case. The court could consider aggravating features, matters likely to be relied upon in mitigation, the possibility of a guilty plea and the prosecution case at its highest, provided that view was reasonably open. The question on review was whether the District Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion, not what sentence the reviewing judge would impose.
5. For W, the seriousness of the offences, the victim’s age, the repeated and escalating conduct and other aggravating features meant that a sentence under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 was potentially within the available range. The District Judge’s evaluation was therefore not unreasonable. W’s application failed.

The two cases consequently proceeded on different venue bases: M’s committal was quashed, while W’s committal remained effective.

The judgment describes judicial review of separate committal decisions made by District Judge Richardson on 31 July 2009. The Administrative Court quashed M’s committal but upheld W’s.