BB, R (on the application of) v West Glamorgan Youth Court & Ors

When deciding whether to send a child or young person to the Crown Court under section 51A of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a youth court must assess whether there is a real prospect that the particular defendant may require detention exceeding two years. For children under 15, such a decision should be very rare. The court must focus on the child’s individual circumstances and involvement, and must not apply adult sentencing guidelines mechanically. The adult guideline is relevant only after the court has concluded that custody is the only appropriate sentence. Where all defendants are under 18, the youth court cannot rely on the interests of justice to send one defendant to the Crown Court merely because co-defendants have been sent there. The unlawful allocation decision was quashed and venue was substituted in the youth court.

BB, aged 13 when charged, faced robbery and attempted robbery allegations arising from an incident involving three other defendants, all under 18. West Glamorgan Youth Court sent all four defendants to the Crown Court under section 51A of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, concluding that BB might receive more than two years’ detention. The youth court relied substantially on adult robbery guidelines, reduced the resulting term by half, and considered that a single Crown Court trial was in the interests of justice.

The Crown Court initially considered that BB should not have been sent for trial but remitted the case to the youth court without jurisdiction to do so. The youth court then repeated its decision. The Divisional Court considered whether the youth court had applied the correct test, sentencing guidance and approach to the interests of justice.

1. Claim allowed. The youth court’s decision was quashed. The Divisional Court substituted its own decision that BB should be tried in the West Glamorgan Youth Court.
2. Under section 51A(3)(b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the question is whether there was a real prospect that this particular child might require a sentence exceeding the youth court’s powers. The assessment must have regard to the child’s age, role and circumstances. Following the amendment to section 3B of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the youth court is no longer making an irrevocable allocation decision. It is therefore generally unnecessary to take the prosecution case at its highest at the allocation stage. The assessment will usually be better made after the facts have been determined.
3. Cases involving defendants under 15 should only rarely be sent for trial in the Crown Court. The availability of a later power to commit for sentence, and any perceived gap in youth-court sentencing powers, cannot justify sending a child to the Crown Court.
4. The justices had applied the sentencing guidelines incorrectly. They should first have considered the child guideline, including whether custody was the only appropriate sentence. Only then could they consult the equivalent adult guideline. Any reduction from the adult sentence had to be individualised and could not be applied mechanically. The justices failed to give proper weight to BB’s age, individual circumstances and the expectation that custody for a child under 14 would be particularly rare.
5. The justices also had no power to use the interests of justice as an independent basis for sending BB to the Crown Court. Section 51(7) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 applied where an adult co-defendant was sent for trial. It did not apply where all defendants were under 18. Each defendant therefore required an appropriate individual venue decision.

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review of the West Glamorgan Youth Court’s allocation decision. The Divisional Court quashed that decision and substituted an order that BB be tried in the youth court.