Macdonald v. Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland

An office-holder is not an employee merely because the office carries remuneration or other benefits. An office-holder may also be an employee, but only where the parties objectively intended to create legally enforceable contractual relations. In determining that question, the tribunal must begin from a neutral position, particularly in disputes involving ministers of religion. There is no general rule that ministers are employees or that they are not. The relationship must be assessed from the relevant facts and documents, including the structure and beliefs of the church. A tribunal’s reasons need only provide a basic account of the relevant facts, applicable law and reasoning; they need not be elaborately drafted.

The claimant, a minister of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, brought proceedings alleging unfair dismissal. The Employment Tribunal held that he was not an employee within section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, concluding that ordination made him an office-holder whose rights and duties arose from the office rather than from contract.

On appeal, the claimant challenged the adequacy of the Tribunal’s written reasons under rule 30(6) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules) Regulations 2004 and the principles in Meek. He sought remission for a rehearing. The central issue was whether the Tribunal’s judgment was sufficiently reasoned.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Tribunal’s judgment was upheld.
2. Under rule 30(6) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules) Regulations 2004, read with Meek, reasons must identify the relevant issues, findings of fact, applicable law and how the law was applied. They need provide only a basic outline, summary of the material facts and statement of reasons. Some reasoning may properly be implicit. The Tribunal’s judgment was economically expressed, but when read as a whole it met that standard.
3. An office-holder is not an employee merely by holding office. An office-holder may also be an employee if the parties intended to create a legally enforceable contract. The fundamental question is whether any contractual relationship existed at all, assessed objectively. The tribunal must begin neutrally and must not presume that clergy lack contractual relations.
4. There is no universal rule concerning the employment status of ministers of religion. The particular facts of the church and the relationship must be examined. Relevant considerations may include mutual intention, control, personal service and remuneration, although there are no rigid requirements beyond an intention to create legal relations.
5. The Tribunal was entitled to conclude objectively that no such intention existed. The Manual, the questions answered at ordination and the Formulae presented the claimant as an office-holder subject to the Church’s ecclesiastical system and exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction. They were not contractual documents or an employee handbook. The claimant’s subjective interpretation of the Church’s constitutional documents was irrelevant to the objective assessment.
6. Even if a contractual intention had existed, the facts did not establish employment. Payment through PAYE, benefits, ministerial duties and incidental committee work were insufficient in the context of the claimant’s independence from supervision and the nature of his office. The Tribunal’s conclusion was therefore entirely understandable.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Appeal from the Employment Tribunal’s judgment registered on 28 May 2009. The appeal was dismissed and the Tribunal’s judgment upheld.