Jackson Grundy Estate Agents v Hall

An employment tribunal must give adequate reasons for preferring one witness’s evidence over another on a crucial disputed issue. A bare preference is insufficient, particularly where a party’s apparent change of position is central to the factual dispute. The tribunal should identify the conflicting evidence and explain why one account is preferred. Where inadequate reasons prevent the Employment Appeal Tribunal from resolving the factual issue itself, the discrimination finding may be set aside and the matter remitted to a fresh tribunal where fairness requires it.

The claimant was dismissed in a redundancy exercise while pregnant. Her role was redundant, and the central issue was whether she had been offered an alternative sales negotiator post at another office. The Employment Tribunal found that the post had not been offered and upheld complaints of unfair dismissal and sex discrimination.

The respondent withdrew its appeal against the unfair dismissal finding but challenged the sex discrimination finding on the ground that the Tribunal had not explained why it preferred the claimant’s evidence over that of the respondent’s manager, especially given inconsistencies between the pleaded case and witness evidence.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The appeal against the unfair dismissal finding was withdrawn. The finding of sex discrimination was set aside because the Employment Tribunal had failed to give adequate reasons for preferring the claimant’s evidence on the crucial question whether the Abington sales negotiator role had been offered.
2. The requirement for adequate reasons, reflected in Meek compliance, required the Tribunal to explain the competing accounts and why one was preferred. The observations in Tchoula v Netto Foodstores Ltd, approved by the Court of Appeal in Anya v University of Oxford [2001] IRLR 377, applied. The Tribunal’s general statement that it preferred the claimant’s evidence did not address her apparent change of position or the absence of an explanation for it.
3. The Employment Appeal Tribunal could not resolve the disputed factual issue itself. The sex discrimination issue was therefore remitted to a fresh Employment Tribunal. The perception of fairness supported that course, applying the guidance in Sinclair, Roche & Temperley v Heard [2004] IRLR 763.
4. The unfair dismissal finding remained undisturbed. The agreed Remedy Judgment was set aside. The claimant remained entitled to a basic award of £660, while any further compensatory award depended on the outcome of the remitted sex discrimination claim. The fresh Tribunal was directed not to see the original Tribunal’s judgment.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: The respondent’s appeal against the unfair dismissal finding was withdrawn. The sex discrimination finding was set aside and remitted to a fresh Employment Tribunal. The agreed Remedy Judgment was also set aside.
• Bedford Employment Tribunal: The Tribunal had found unfair dismissal and sex discrimination in its judgment promulgated on 19 February 2009.