Patrick Thomas Tibbetts v The Attorney General of the Cayman Islands (Cayman Islands)

Apparent bias is assessed by a fair-minded and informed observer, using facts found by the court on the balance of probabilities. The court then asks whether those facts create a real possibility that the juror was biased. Where the allegation concerns partiality towards a witness, the inquiry considers the relationship or knowledge and whether it might have affected acceptance of the evidence. Prior social contact, including shared holidays, does not automatically establish bias. Its significance depends on the context, including the closeness and age of the association, what was discussed, the importance and challenge of the evidence, and the jury directions. Unchallenged evidence may be accepted because it is true rather than because of a relationship. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands of two counts of assisting the retention or placement of criminal proceeds and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands dismissed his appeal against conviction, giving reasons on 24 January 2006.

Special leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted on the sole issue of apparent bias arising from a juror’s previous social association with a prosecution witness and the witness’s wife. The central question was whether a fair-minded and informed observer, knowing the relevant facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the juror, and therefore the jury, was biased.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Clarke delivered the judgment of the Board, which advised that the appeal should be dismissed. The verdict was not tainted by apparent bias.
2. Applicable test. The Board applied the fair-minded and informed observer test stated in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 and the balanced-observer guidance in R v Abdroikof [2007] UKHL 37. The observer is a reasonable member of the public, neither complacent nor naïve, nor cynical or suspicious. The court must first find the relevant facts on the balance of probabilities. It must then decide, on the basis of those facts, whether the observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The two-stage approach was supported by AWG Group Ltd v Morrison [2006] EWCA Civ 6.
3. Juror–witness relationship. Where alleged partiality concerns a juror’s relationship with or knowledge of a witness, the court must examine both the nature of the association and whether it might have caused the juror to accept the witness’s evidence because of that association. Prior social contact, including a shared holiday, is relevant but does not automatically establish apparent bias. The closeness and recency of the relationship, the matters discussed, the significance of the evidence, whether it was challenged, and the judge’s directions must be assessed in context.
4. Application. The juror had socialised intermittently with the witness and his wife, but was not a close friend and the association had ended more than three years before trial. The discussions about the investment scheme did not implicate the appellant or establish a preconceived belief in his guilt. The witness’s evidence was largely unchallenged, and the appellant did not materially contradict it. The putative observer would therefore conclude that the evidence was accepted because it was true and unchallenged, not because of the prior association. The Board agreed that there was no real possibility that the juror, and hence the jury, was biased.
5. Costs. Unless application was made within 28 days, the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

• Privy Council: Appeal dismissed. The Board advised that the verdict was not tainted by apparent bias: [2010] UKPC 8.
• Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands: Appeal against conviction dismissed on 18 November 2005; reasons delivered on 24 January 2006.
• Grand Court of the Cayman Islands: The appellant was convicted on two money-laundering counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of three years’ imprisonment.