MD v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Women in the Ivory Coast may constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Risk depends on the applicant’s individual cultural, social, tribal and regional circumstances.

Attitudes to women differ substantially between traditional rural communities and cosmopolitan urban centres. Where a woman faces a real risk of female genital mutilation, forced marriage, domestic violence, consequences of adultery or discrimination in a particular area, state protection there is unlikely to be sufficient. Internal relocation, usually to an urban centre, may nevertheless be reasonable and not unduly harsh.

Operational Guidance Notes are policy statements, not country information, and must be assessed on their merits.

MD, an Ivorian national, appealed against the refusal of asylum and directions for her removal. She had previously been dismissed by an Immigration Judge, whose determination was set aside for material error of law after reconsideration was ordered.

Her accepted account was that she had been subjected to female genital mutilation and a forced customary marriage, and had fled after becoming pregnant by another man. She claimed that her father, customary husband and their communities would harm her on return, and that she could not safely live as a lone mother.

The Tribunal reconsidered the country evidence, the reliability of the country expert evidence, protection, internal relocation, humanitarian protection, and Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The central issues were whether she faced a Convention risk or Article 3 harm, and whether return to Abidjan was safe and reasonable.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal set aside the earlier decision for error of law but, on reconsideration, dismissed the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

2. Women in the Ivory Coast are capable of constituting a particular social group. Female genital mutilation, forced marriage and domestic violence may amount to persecution where the state does not provide sufficient protection. That conclusion does not establish a countrywide risk. The assessment must address the applicant’s particular community, region and circumstances.

3. There was a marked contrast between traditional rural areas, particularly in the north and centre, and Abidjan and other urban centres. In a locality where harmful traditional practices created a real risk, state protection was unlikely to be sufficient. A woman could, however, be able to relocate to an urban centre without undue hardship, subject to a case-specific assessment of available support and personal circumstances.

4. The Tribunal preferred the Foreign and Commonwealth Office evidence to the appellant’s expert evidence on customary punishment for adultery. The expert evidence contained material errors, including reliance on material concerning Uganda and Nigeria. The Tribunal found no sufficient evidence that the appellant faced traditional punishment, honour killing or criminal prosecution for adultery arising from a customary, rather than legally recognised, marriage.

5. Abidjan was the appellant’s true home area. She had spent most of her life there, knew the city and had previously obtained support there. Her father lacked the influence or means to discover her return or whereabouts. She had not established a real risk of persecution, Article 3 ill-treatment, destitution or enforced prostitution there. Internal relocation therefore did not arise on her facts.

6. Removal with her child would interfere with her private life, but it was proportionate to the legitimate aim of effective immigration control. Her depression and past trauma did not establish a breach of Articles 3 or 8 or entitlement to humanitarian protection.

• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Set aside the earlier determination for error of law and, after reconsideration, dismissed the appeal.
• Immigration Judge: Dismissed the appellant’s asylum and human rights appeal and found that she was not entitled to humanitarian protection.
• Reconsideration stage: Senior Immigration Judge Nichols found a material error of law in the Immigration Judge’s treatment of protection, internal relocation and particular social group.