Ahmed v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Paragraph 4(9) of Schedule 3 to the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 requires a real link between the claimant’s move, the loan and the acquisition of alternative accommodation more suited to a disabled person’s special needs. The events need not be contemporaneous. However, the condition is not satisfied merely because a claimant later buys a property in which she already lives. A substantial gap may be compatible with the paragraph where the facts show an obvious link. A six-year gap meant that the loan in this case acquired existing suitable accommodation rather than alternative accommodation.

The appellant sought assistance with housing costs as part of her income support claim. She and her severely disabled son moved from rented accommodation in Old Trafford to the property in 2001. She purchased the property in 2007 with an interest-only mortgage loan. Her application was refused.

The Manchester Appeal Tribunal allowed her appeal. On the Secretary of State’s appeal, Judge Lloyd-Davies in the Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal on 26 August 2009. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the property constituted alternative accommodation and whether the Old Trafford property was accommodation occupied before its acquisition.

The appeal was dismissed. Mr Justice Warren gave the judgment, with which Lord Justice Rimer and Lord Justice Longmore agreed.

1. Paragraph 4(9) of Schedule 3 to the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 requires a link between the claimant’s move, the loan and the acquisition. The events need not be contemporaneous, but the condition cannot be established merely by showing that one property was occupied at an earlier time, another property was later acquired, and the latter was more suitable for a disabled person.
2. The decision in CIS/3295/2003 had to be approached with care. It correctly did not impose a fixed rule that any temporal gap was fatal. It treated the issue as dependent on the circumstances and remitted the matter for findings of fact. It did not decide that paragraph 4(9) applied, nor did it permit the necessary link to be ignored.
3. On the facts, the six-year interval between moving into the property and acquiring it could not be disregarded. The loan was taken out to acquire the appellant’s existing, already suitable accommodation, rather than alternative accommodation. The Old Trafford property was therefore not accommodation occupied before the acquisition for the purposes of paragraph 4(9). Judge Neary had failed adequately to address this necessary link, and Judge Lloyd-Davies had correctly allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal.
4. The court gave examples showing that a gap might be consistent with paragraph 4(9) where an obvious link between the move, loan and acquisition remained. Whether such cases fall within the paragraph was not argued and was left undecided.

The appellant’s appeal was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2011] EWCA Civ 1186, the court dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Judge Lloyd-Davies allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal by written decision dated 26 August 2009.
• Manchester Appeal Tribunal: The tribunal allowed the appellant’s appeal, giving written reasons dated 21 April 2008.