IA, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

A challenge to a compulsory purchase order under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 must be made within six weeks, and that time limit is absolute. The application must identify a statutory ground and the legal basis for the relief sought; a label or bare request to quash is insufficient. Judicial review proceedings may in principle be converted, but wholly new grounds cannot be introduced after the statutory period. An appellate court should interfere with a refusal to adjourn only for an error of law or principle, a material omission or a plainly wrong conclusion. Failure to cite every authority or statutory provision is not fatal where the substance shows that proportionality and disability-related duties were addressed.

The appellant owned and intermittently occupied a severely dilapidated house. Following an inquiry, the Secretary of State confirmed a compulsory purchase order made for housing purposes by the London Borough of Wandsworth.

The appellant commenced judicial review within six weeks, although that was the wrong procedure, and later wrote seeking to rely on section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. He supplied no grounds under that section. Nearly a year after expiry of the statutory period, he sought an adjournment and stay to investigate and potentially convert the proceedings. HHJ Mackie QC refused the applications. The appeal concerned the validity and amendment of the purported statutory challenge, and the prospects of proposed grounds concerning capacity and fairness, Article 8 proportionality, and disability equality duties.

Appeal dismissed. The judge had not erred in refusing an adjournment or stay.

1. The appellate review was limited. The appellant had to show an error of law or principle, that a material consideration had been wrongly included or omitted, or that the judge’s conclusion was plainly wrong.
2. The six-week limit in section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 was absolute and could not be extended. The court applied Smith v East Elloe RDC [1956] AC 736 and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Ostler [1977] QB 122.
3. Following Burton v The Secretary of State for Transport [1998] 2 EGLR 35 and Okolo v Secretary of State for the Environment [1997] 2 All ER 242, a purported section 23 application had to disclose a statutory ground and a legal basis for relief. Calling a document an application was insufficient. The appellant’s letter did not amount to a valid application, and it was not open in principle to introduce wholly new grounds almost a year after the time limit had expired.
4. There was no realistic prospect of establishing a breach of natural justice or Article 6. The appellant had been able to give evidence and cross-examine witnesses, was assisted by his brother and another objector, and had been given adequate time and opportunity to present his case.
5. The court did not need to resolve whether the more rigorous proportionality formulation in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532 applied. Even assuming that it did, the Inspector had considered whether practicable and less intrusive means could achieve the housing objective. A formal citation of Daly or Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167 was unnecessary. The fact-based conclusion was not susceptible to a full merits review.
6. The Inspector had had due regard to the appellant’s disability under section 49A of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Section 49A(1)(d) did not require favourable treatment where it was infeasible or inappropriate. The absence of express reference to the provision was unfortunate but not determinative, although such reference was good practice, as explained in R (Baker) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] LGR 239.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal dismissed. [2011] EWCA Civ 1253.
2. Administrative Court — HHJ Mackie QC refused permission for judicial review and refused an adjournment and stay on 19 November 2010. No citation was stated in the judgment.