Ridgeland Properties Ltd v Bristol City Council

Late fresh evidence is not admitted merely because it may materially improve the result. Where the evidence was available throughout the proceedings, the applicant must show reasonable diligence and explain its omission. The court must balance its possible importance against finality, fairness and efficient litigation. The threshold is especially demanding where admission would require a wholly new valuation case after a lengthy hearing and draft decision. In compulsory-acquisition cases, the principle of equivalence does not give a party a second opportunity to advance a different valuation method. An appellate court should interfere with the tribunal’s discretionary balance only where it was wholly wrong, or involved failure to consider relevant matters or consideration of irrelevant matters.

Ridgeland Properties Ltd claimed compensation for the compulsory acquisition and demolition of Tollgate House. The parties had agreed that sections 14 to 16 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 were relevant and that valuation should proceed by the residual method.

After issuing a draft decision valuing the compensation at £4.5 million, the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) refused the appellant’s application to reopen the hearing and admit three earlier offer letters. The offers ranged from £15.3 million to £23 million. The final decision maintained the £4.5 million award. The central issue was whether refusal to admit the evidence was an error of law.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. Appellate restraint. The Upper Tribunal had a discretion to admit fresh evidence. The Court of Appeal would interfere only if the decision was wholly wrong, outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement, or involved failure to consider relevant matters or consideration of irrelevant matters, applying the approach in G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] IWLR 647.
2. Fresh evidence. The principles in Charlesworth v Relay Roads [2000] 1 WLR 230 and Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1WLR 1489 governed the application. The offer letters were available throughout the proceedings and could have been used at the hearing. The appellant therefore failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence. That failure included the company’s failure to ensure that its legal and expert team had considered the evidence.
3. The application did not seek merely to supplement the existing valuation evidence. It sought to replace the residual method, which the parties had agreed was appropriate, with a wholly new valuation case. After a lengthy hearing and publication of a draft decision, such an application required the most cogent justification. The Tribunal was entitled to refuse it.
4. The Court accepted that genuine, unsolicited and serious offers might have evidential value. Offers based on the compulsory acquisition scheme would have to be disregarded in the no-scheme world. The effects of elapsed time, planning assumptions and conditionality could be assessed by valuation adjustments. This did not make the refusal to reopen the hearing unlawful.
5. If the omission was attributable to the expert or solicitors, the appellant could seek redress from them. In Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13, the Supreme Court had abolished expert-witness immunity from suit and overruled Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75. That potential remedy was a powerful reason against allowing an entirely new valuation case.
6. The principle of equivalence and the public interest in paying the correct compensation, no more and no less, did not override finality or confer a right to a second valuation opportunity. There was no breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, or the overriding objective.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the appeal and upheld the refusal to admit the fresh evidence: [2011] EWCA Civ 649.
• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) refused the application to reopen the hearing on 26 August 2009 and subsequently determined compensation at £4.5 million in its final decision dated 24 May 2010.