Pryor v Greater Manchester Police

Under the Road Traffic Act 1988, the power to seize a vehicle for suspected uninsured driving is conditional. The driver must fail to produce the relevant certificate of insurance before the constable’s reasonable grounds for belief become operative.

The relevant certificate is one that covers the driver’s use of the vehicle. It need not identify that vehicle specifically. A valid policy extension for driving another person’s vehicle, supported by evidence of the owner’s consent, is sufficient. An honest but mistaken police interpretation of the certificate cannot justify seizure where cover existed. Unauthorised seizure may constitute wrongful interference with goods.

David Pryor brought a claim for wrongful interference with goods after the police seized his Honda Prelude while it was being driven by his friend, Tony Burton. Burton produced a valid Saga certificate covering his driving of another motor vehicle with the owner’s consent, together with Pryor’s written consent.

The police believed that the Honda required separate insurance and seized it under section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The District Judge dismissed the claim after a small-claims trial, and Mr Recorder Parrington dismissed Pryor’s appeal. The Court of Appeal granted permission for a second appeal. The central issue was the meaning of the relevant certificate of insurance and whether the statutory conditions for seizure had been satisfied.

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal. Lord Justice Ward delivered the leading judgment, Lord Justice Stanley Burnton agreed for additional reasons, and Lady Justice Black agreed with both judgments.

1. Cumulative statutory conditions. Lawful seizure under section 165A(3) required three conditions: a uniformed constable had required production under section 165 of evidence that the vehicle was not being driven contrary to section 143; the driver had failed to produce the relevant certificate of insurance; and the constable had reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle was being so driven.
2. Meaning of the certificate. The relevant certificate under section 165(2)(a) was the certificate covering the driving of the vehicle in question when production was required. It did not have to name that vehicle. The Saga certificate was a valid Form A certificate and, read with Pryor’s written consent, showed that Burton’s policy extended to his use of the Honda.
3. Application. Burton therefore produced the required evidence and had not failed to comply with section 165A(3)(b). The fact that the police computer showed no current keeper or insurance for the Honda, and the mistaken information supplied by Saga, could not alter the plain meaning of the certificate. Since condition (b) was absent, the court did not reach the reasonable-grounds condition in section 165A(3)(c).
4. Additional reasoning. Lord Justice Burnton considered that the respondent’s construction would leave an insured driver exposed to conviction under section 165(3), because producing the certificate later at a police station would not cure failure to produce a vehicle-specific certificate at the roadside. That consequence was unacceptable and could not have been intended by Parliament.
5. The seizure was unauthorised and constituted wrongful interference with Pryor’s goods. Judgment was entered for Pryor, with damages to be assessed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On the second appeal, the court allowed the appeal and entered judgment for the claimant, with damages to be assessed: [2011] EWCA Civ 749.
2. Manchester County Court — District Judge Fairclough dismissed Pryor’s claim for wrongful interference with goods on 24 August 2009.
3. Manchester County Court, appellate decision — Mr Recorder Parrington dismissed Pryor’s appeal from the District Judge’s decision. Rix LJ granted permission for a second appeal.