Mew & Anor v Tristmire Ltd

Whether an object has become part of the land depends objectively on the degree and purpose of its annexation. Physical attachment is not decisive. A structure designed to be removed as a unit, without dismantling or destruction, will generally retain its character as a chattel, even if used as a home, resting on permanent supports, or connected to mains services.

Where harbour platforms are provided as facilities for locating houseboats, a tenancy or licence of the plot and platforms does not thereby include the separately owned houseboat. The occupation is therefore not an assured tenancy under the Housing Act 1988 merely because the houseboat is used as residential accommodation.

Tristmire acquired leasehold plots in Bembridge Harbour occupied by two converted landing craft used as houseboats. The appellants owned the houseboats but claimed that they occupied the plots as tenants and that the boats were dwellinghouses let as separate dwellings under the Housing Act 1988.

The Newport (Isle of Wight) County Court held that the houseboats had not become annexed to the land and that the appellants were licensees. It held that later notices terminated their rights of occupation and made no determination on rent-increase notices under section 13. The central issue on appeal was whether placing the houseboats on harbour platforms had made them part of the land.

1. Appeal dismissed. Patten LJ gave the judgment, with Arden LJ and Maurice Kay LJ agreeing.
2. Annexation is determined by degree and purpose, assessed objectively. The relevant condition is that of the object when it was placed on the land. Its later deterioration and subsequent improvements are not decisive. Physical attachment is relevant but not conclusive; the court must consider whether the object was placed for the better enjoyment of itself as a chattel or for the use and enjoyment of the land.
3. In Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 1 WLR 687, the bungalow was part of the realty because it had been constructed on site as a permanent residence and could only be removed by demolition. The present houseboats were materially different. They began as landing craft, were capable of floating, and could have been lifted and removed as complete units when placed on the platforms. Their later deterioration did not alter that conclusion.
4. The supporting platforms were provided and owned by BHIC as harbour facilities under the Pier and Harbour Order (Bembridge Harbour) Confirmation Act 1963. It was therefore wrong to treat the platforms and houseboats as a single unit. The separate ownership and sale of the houseboats, together with the course of dealing between the harbour company and the occupiers, showed that the plot arrangements did not extend to the boats. The purpose of raising the boats above the tide was their more convenient use as chattels, not the improvement or enjoyment of the harbour bed.
5. The appellants were not assured tenants under section 1 of the Housing Act 1988. The judge was entitled to find that they were licensees, and the November 2010 notices effectively terminated their occupation. Even if the plots had been held under tenancies, a tenancy of the plots and platforms alone would not have attracted statutory protection. The alternative findings and the validity of the section 13 notices therefore did not arise. There was no absolute bar to relying on notices served after proceedings had begun, and the possession order could properly be made on the basis of the last notices.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed. Patten LJ gave the judgment and Arden LJ and Maurice Kay LJ agreed: [2011] EWCA Civ 912.
• Newport (Isle of Wight) County Court: His Honour Graham Jones held that the appellants were licensees, that the houseboats had not become annexed to the land, and that the November 2010 notices terminated their rights of occupation.