Widdows, R. v

For an offence under section 4(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the relevant course of conduct must amount to harassment. Proof of two or more assaults, and of resulting fear of future violence, does not alone satisfy that requirement.

In deciding whether conduct is harassment, the court must consider its character and context. Incidents spread across a long, predominantly affectionate relationship, which both parties continued to seek, will not normally constitute harassment merely because violence occurred. The jury must receive a sufficient direction on that distinct requirement. An inappropriate harassment count joined with rape counts may contribute to an unsafe conviction where the allegations distract from each other.

The respondent was convicted at Norwich Crown Court of putting his former partner in fear of violence by harassment, contrary to section 4(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. He was acquitted of two rape counts arising from the final alleged incident.

The section 4 count relied on six alleged incidents of violence or intimidation during a volatile relationship lasting from 2008 to 2010. The trial judge directed the jury principally on assault, self-defence, accident, fear of violence and knowledge, but did not sufficiently explain the separate requirement that the course of conduct amount to harassment. The respondent appealed against conviction. The central issues were whether the evidence could amount to harassment and whether the section 4 count was properly joined with the rape counts.

1. Appeal allowed; conviction quashed. The conviction under section 4(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was unsafe.

2. Following Curtis [2010] EWCA Crim 123, the court held that the course of conduct required by section 4(1) must be conduct amounting to harassment. The requirement arises even though section 4 does not itself use the word “harassment”. Fear of violence on at least two occasions and the defendant’s knowledge of that fear are necessary elements, but they are not sufficient without a harassing course of conduct.

3. The alleged incidents did not satisfy that requirement. They were acts said to have occurred over nine months within a close relationship which was volatile but predominantly affectionate, and which both parties repeatedly resumed. The uncharged violence was relied on to create fear of further violence. It did not thereby become a course of conduct amounting to harassment.

4. The summing up was deficient because it concentrated on whether earlier acts were unlawful assaults. It did not give the jury an adequate direction on what could constitute a course of conduct amounting to harassment.

5. It was also inappropriate, in these circumstances, to join the section 4 count with the rape counts. Each set of allegations should have been considered without distraction from the other. That misjoinder, together with the inappropriate harassment count and inadequate direction, meant that the conviction could not stand.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against conviction and quashed the conviction: [2011] EWCA Crim 1500.

• Norwich Crown Court: On 3 November 2010, the respondent was convicted under section 4(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and acquitted of two rape counts. On 19 November 2010, the court imposed a suspended sentence order and ancillary orders.