Taylor, R. v

A court may impose a determinate sentence for offences committed by a life prisoner and direct that it begin when the prisoner’s minimum term ends, provided the prisoner has not been released on licence. Section 154 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 supplies that power. Section 265 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not restrict it in those circumstances. Section 28(7) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 supports that construction. The added term is punishment for the new offences. It is not double punishment merely because the Parole Board may also consider the conduct when assessing risk. The term must nevertheless reflect totality, including the length of the existing minimum term.

R v Taylor concerned an appeal against sentence. The appellant was serving life imprisonment for murder, with a minimum term of 23 years. While in prison, he assaulted six prison officers, causing serious injuries to three of them.

The sentencing judge imposed concurrent terms resulting in three years’ imprisonment and directed that the term run consecutively to the existing life sentence, so that it would begin after the minimum term. The appellant contended that such an order was unlawful, amounted to double punishment, and was excessive having regard to totality. The central issue was whether a determinate sentence could lawfully be ordered to commence at the end of a life prisoner’s minimum term.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentencing court had statutory power to direct that the three-year determinate sentence commence when the appellant’s 23-year minimum term expired.

2. Section 154 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 permits a Crown Court sentence to take effect at a different time if the court so directs. The only relevant restriction was section 265 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which concerns a person released on licence. It did not apply because the appellant remained in custody under the life sentence.

3. Section 28(7) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 expressly contemplated a life prisoner also serving a determinate term. It provided that such a prisoner could require a referral to the Parole Board only after serving one half of that term. The statutory scheme therefore permitted a further term to extend the earliest date at which release could be considered.

4. The older reasoning in R v Foy [1962] 1 WLR 609 arose under a materially different release regime. The court followed R v Hills [2009] 1 Cr App R(S) 75, which held that clearly specified minimum terms made such an order practical and lawful. R v Delucca and Others [2011] 1 Cr App R(S) 7 concerned determinate and indeterminate sentences imposed at the same time, and did not establish a prohibition on a later sentence for a further offence.

5. The determinate term punished the assaults. The Parole Board’s later assessment of risk was a separate matter, so no double penalty arose. Totality remained relevant: a sentence following a long minimum term had to be tailored accordingly. On the serious facts, three years was not excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against sentence: [2011] EWCA Crim 2236.
• Sentencing court (not further identified) — imposed a total of three years’ imprisonment for assaults on prison officers and directed it to run consecutively to the appellant’s existing life sentence.