Mateza, R. v

In assessing a text message under the hearsay regime in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a court should identify the matter sought to be proved and ask whether the message makes a statement of that matter. If it does not, the hearsay provisions do not apply, although ordinary relevance remains to be determined from the message and its context.

An admitted fabrication, dishonesty and inconsistencies in a complainant’s evidence do not necessarily require a no-case ruling. A case may properly remain for the jury where there is independent evidence supporting the central account. On appeal, the court must review the whole evidence and be satisfied that the convictions are safe.

The appellants were convicted by a jury in the Crown Court at Isleworth of an offence under section 18 and firearms offences arising from the shooting of a 16-year-old complainant.

They appealed with leave of the single judge. Pedro challenged the exclusion of a text message received by a co-defendant which offered guns for sale. Both appellants contended that the complainant’s inconsistencies, dishonesty and admitted fabrication of Facebook evidence meant that there was no case to answer and that their convictions were unsafe.

The central issues were whether the text message should have been admitted and whether the remaining evidence could properly and safely support the convictions.

1. Appeals dismissed. The convictions were safe.
2. The trial judge had relied on R v Leonard [2009] EWCA 1251 when excluding the text message. The court held that the governing analysis was that in R v Twist [2011] EWCA Crim 1143. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides a new statutory definition and code for hearsay, so earlier concepts concerning implied assertions should not be used in place of that analysis.
3. The proper questions were: what matter is sought to be proved; whether the text contains a statement of that matter; if not, whether the message is nevertheless relevant; and whether the proposed inference can properly be derived from it. The text did not state that the co-defendant wished to buy guns. It was therefore not hearsay on that issue. It could be relevant, but the court lacked sufficient information about the message and the contents of the phone to assess its probative force conclusively.
4. Assuming that the exclusion was erroneous, it could not affect the safety of the convictions. The suggested innocent explanation, that the appellant had stumbled upon a gun transaction, was fanciful in the circumstances in which the weapons were found.
5. The complainant had given inconsistent accounts and had fabricated evidence during the trial. Those matters were serious, but they did not compel a no-case ruling. There was independent support for her central account, including the shooting, the location, the weapons found there, the evidence of an attacking group, Pedro’s proximity and admission of being near the scene, and evidence undermining Sebastian’s purported alibi.
6. The judge was entitled to leave the case to the jury. The summing-up placed the complainant’s credibility defects fully and carefully before the jury. Having reviewed all the evidence, the court concluded that a jury could properly and safely convict both appellants.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeals dismissed; convictions upheld in [2011] EWCA Crim 2587.
• Crown Court at Isleworth: The appellants were convicted by a jury of an offence under section 18 and firearms offences.