Long, R. v

Where evidence of earlier transactions is admitted because it may support an accused’s case that he lacked knowledge or suspicion, the jury must receive clear directions on its purpose. The judge should explain any acceptance by the prosecution that the earlier transactions were not criminal, and the way in which that may bear on the accused’s state of mind. A direction which leaves the jury free to treat such evidence as proof of prior similar wrongdoing creates a real risk of prejudice. That risk may render a conviction under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 unsafe.

The appellant was convicted at Harrow Crown Court of entering into or being concerned in a money-laundering arrangement contrary to section 328(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. A cheque obtained by fraud from an elderly householder was paid into his account, and its proceeds were withdrawn.

In interview, the appellant accepted that he had previously banked substantial cheques for acquaintances and returned the money in cash. The Crown did not allege that those earlier transactions involved criminal conduct. The evidence nevertheless went before the jury, and the summing-up recited it in detail without explaining its limited relevance to the defence case.

The appeal concerned whether that omission made the conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal allowed. The conviction was unsafe because the jury were not clearly directed on the relevance of the appellant’s earlier banking transactions.

2. The Crown did not contend that the earlier payments into the appellant’s account were money-laundering transactions or involved misconduct by him. They could therefore not advance the prosecution case by showing a history of criminal conduct. The defence relied on them to show that the appellant had previously provided the same banking service in transactions accepted to be untainted, and thus had no reason to know or suspect that the later cheque concerned criminal property.

3. If the evidence was to be left before the jury, the judge had to explain that purpose in clear terms. The jury should have been told both that the Crown accepted the earlier transactions were not criminal and that the evidence could bear on whether the appellant had the requisite knowledge or suspicion in relation to the charged arrangement under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

4. Instead, the summing-up invited consideration of the pattern of the earlier transactions without identifying why they were relevant. That created a risk that the jury would treat them as evidence that the appellant had previously facilitated money laundering and would use them adversely when deciding his state of mind on the charged transaction.

5. The appellant did not give evidence, and no good-character or bad-character direction was given. Those features made a precise explanation of the earlier transactions’ relevance particularly important. The defect was sufficiently serious to render the conviction unsafe. The court indicated that there was no question of a retrial.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By [2011] EWCA Crim 767, the court allowed the appeal against conviction and held the conviction unsafe.
• Crown Court at Harrow: On 9 July 2010, His Honour Judge Greenwood and a jury convicted the appellant of the money-laundering offence.