D' Cunha, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board

A Parole Board must give an intelligible explanation showing that it has fairly considered the principal issues, but it need not address every witness or piece of evidence separately. The Board may reject expert evidence where it gives coherent reasons for doing so. Judicial review does not permit the court to reweigh risk or substitute its own assessment.

Advice on transfer to open conditions is distinct from the statutory decision on release. Where the Secretary of State invites such advice under directions requiring a balanced assessment, the Board must consider both risk and the benefits of open conditions, including compliance with temporary release conditions, trustworthiness, and opportunities for further risk-reduction work. Failure to conduct that separate assessment renders the advice unlawful.

The claimant, an IPP prisoner, sought judicial review of a Parole Board decision declining to direct his release and declining to recommend his transfer to open conditions. The Panel considered that his principal risk factor was a propensity to lose control and behave violently, which had not been adequately addressed.

The claimant challenged the adequacy of the reasons, the Panel’s assessment of the need for anger-management work, the weight given to completed offending-behaviour courses, and the approach to open conditions. The central issue was whether the Panel had lawfully assessed risk and had separately applied the Secretary of State’s directions governing advice on transfer to open conditions.

1. Release. The challenge to the refusal to direct release failed. Under section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the Board’s task was to assess whether continued detention remained necessary for public protection. The court could not substitute its own view for the Panel’s assessment of risk.
2. Reasons and evidence. The Panel’s decision letter adequately explained why it rejected or gave limited weight to the professional evidence. It was not required to identify every witness separately or explain every disagreement in detail, provided that a fair reading disclosed the principal reasoning. The Panel was entitled to prefer its assessment of a propensity for loss of control and violence over the view that deficient thinking skills were the primary risk factor.
3. Rationality and completed courses. The Panel had not irrationally required completion of a particular course. It had stated that the identified risk remained inadequately addressed, without prescribing a specific programme. It had considered the possibility of ART work in open conditions. The Panel had also recognised that the claimant’s completed courses reduced his risk, but was entitled to conclude that an unacceptable risk remained.
4. Open conditions. Advice on transfer to open conditions was an extra-statutory function distinct from the statutory release decision. The Secretary of State’s directions generated a legitimate expectation that the Board would follow the relevant directions. The directions required a balanced assessment, with emphasis on risk reduction, rather than simply applying the conclusion reached on release.
5. The Panel had not shown that it separately considered the benefits and risks specific to open conditions, including compliance with temporary release conditions, trustworthiness, the value of a more realistic environment, and the availability of further anger-management work. The advice on transfer was therefore quashed and remitted for reconsideration. The refusal to direct release remained undisturbed, and reconsideration did not require a fresh panel.

First-instance judicial review. The judgment does not state any prior appellate decision in the present litigation.