Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates Plc

A consideration is material to planning only if it serves a planning purpose relating to the character of land use, rather than the identity or personal purpose of a particular occupier. A policy may protect a class of industrial uses for a genuine planning purpose, although existing occupiers benefit incidentally. Personal hardship and other human circumstances may exceptionally be considered directly, provided a specific case is made and reasons are given.

Statutory reasons must be proper, adequate and intelligible, and must address the substantial points, but they may be brief and read in context. A local planning authority must include its actual development and land-use policies in the statutory plan. It cannot shelter omitted policies within non-statutory guidance under the guise of exceptional circumstances or discretionary detail.

Great Portland Estates Plc challenged parts of the City of Westminster district plan under section 244 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. Woolf J dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal allowed the company's appeal and quashed policies concerning protected industrial uses and office development outside the central activities zone.

The council appealed. The industrial issue was whether the policies pursued a permissible land-use purpose or impermissibly protected particular occupiers. The office issues were whether the council had given adequate reasons for rejecting an inspector's recommendation and whether it had unlawfully placed substantive office-development policies in non-statutory guidance rather than the statutory plan.

Lord Scarman delivered the only reasoned speech. Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Roskill and Lord Bridge of Harwich expressly agreed with it, and Lord Wilberforce concurred.

1. Appeal allowed in part. Per Lord Scarman, the Court of Appeal's order was varied by removing the industrial policies in paragraphs 11.22 to 11.26 from the provisions quashed. The order quashing the office policies in paragraphs 10.21 to 10.23 remained in force. The cause was remitted to the Queen's Bench Division, with no order for costs in the House or below.

2. Per Lord Scarman, the governing planning principle stated in East Barnet Urban District Council v British Transport Commission [1962] 2 Q.B. 484 applies to development plans as well as development control. The material-consideration test is whether the consideration serves a planning purpose. Such a purpose concerns the character of the use of land, rather than the particular purpose of a particular occupier.

   The industrial policies pursued the genuine planning purpose of preserving industrial uses important to Westminster's character, vitality and functioning. Their incidental protection of existing occupiers did not invalidate them. Private rights, including landlords' rights under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, take effect subject to planning control.

3. Per Lord Scarman, personal hardship, an occupier's circumstances and the difficulties of businesses valuable to a community may sometimes be considered directly. They operate as exceptional or special circumstances, rather than as a general planning policy. A specific case must be made and the authority must give reasons for accepting it.

4. Per Lord Scarman, reasons required from a public body must be proper, adequate and intelligible, and must address the substantial points raised. They may nevertheless be brief. The council's terse rejection of the inspector's recommendation satisfied regulation 17(1) of the Town and Country Planning (Local Plans for Greater London) Regulations 1974 because its reasoning was clear from the plan and the rejection read together.

5. Per Lord Scarman, development plans are authoritative general guides rather than inflexible blueprints. Other material considerations may remain relevant. That flexibility does not permit an authority to omit actual policy proposals from the statutory plan and place them in non-statutory guidance. The omitted office policies should have been included in the plan, where interested persons could object and obtain a public inquiry. The council therefore failed to comply with Schedule 4 to the Town and Country Planning Act 1971.

6. Per Lord Scarman, the power to quash for statutory non-compliance under section 244(2) is discretionary. The Court of Appeal was entitled to quash the office policies, and there was no basis for the House to interfere with its exercise of discretion.

1. House of Lords: In Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates Plc [1985] AC 661, the council's appeal was allowed in part. The Court of Appeal's order was varied so that the industrial policies were no longer quashed, while the quashing of the office policies remained. The cause was remitted to the Queen's Bench Division.
2. Court of Appeal: The company's appeal was allowed. Parts of the district plan concerning protected industrial uses and office development outside the central activities zone were quashed.
3. High Court: Woolf J dismissed the company's application under section 244 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971.