Titchfield Festival Theatre Limited v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor

Section 57(4) requires a counter-factual inquiry. The development enforced against must be treated as not having occurred, and the decision-maker must identify the immediately preceding lawful use of the land covered by the enforcement notice.

• The provision does not require spatial unity, a single planning unit, a single permission, or unity of purpose.
• The court must not add limitations absent from the statutory language.
• The concepts of a planning unit and a new chapter in planning history address different questions and should not be confused.

The appellant operated a theatre across three adjoining areas. An enforcement notice alleged an unauthorised material change of use to theatre use and engineering operations. The appellant relied on section 57(4) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, contending that, if the alleged breach were disregarded, Areas A and B could revert to theatre use and Area C to storage use.

The inspector upheld the notice, subject to extending the compliance period. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal under section 289 of the Act in [2025] EWHC 883 (Admin). The central issues before the Court of Appeal were the proper construction of section 57(4), including whether spatial unity was required, and whether the alleged development had extinguished the earlier use rights.

1. Disposition. Holgate LJ, with whom Dove LJ agreed, granted permission on grounds 1 and 2(3) only and allowed the appeal on those grounds. The enforcement notice appeal was remitted to a different inspector for a fresh public inquiry and redetermination. Lewison LJ agreed and added observations.
2. Construction of section 57(4). The statutory inquiry has five stages: identify the development alleged in the enforcement notice; identify the immediately preceding use of the relevant land; assume that the alleged development did not take place; determine whether the immediately preceding use was lawful; and, if it was lawful, permit reversion without a further planning permission. The approach follows the House of Lords’ reasoning in Young v Secretary of State for the Environment [1983] 2 AC 662.
3. The provision concerns the land covered by the enforcement notice and the use or uses which immediately preceded the alleged breach. Nothing in the statutory language requires the former use to have covered the whole notice land, to have been referable to a single planning unit, or to have involved a single purpose or mixed use. The court declined to add a spatial-unity or purposive-unity requirement. The comprehensive statutory scheme also precluded importing a broader judicial principle contrary to the language of the Act, as explained in Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment [1985] AC 132.
4. The inspector had wrongly relied on the creation of a new planning unit and the material change of use because those matters resulted from the very development which section 57(4) required her to disregard. The same error affected both the ground (a) planning appeal and the ground (f) challenge to the remedial steps.
5. Mansi and planning-unit terminology. Mansi v Elstree Rural District Council (1965) 16 P & CR 153 concerns the drafting of an enforcement notice so that it does not interfere with rights unaffected by the breach. It does not govern the interpretation of section 57(4). The ordinary planning-unit concept used to assess material change of use, explained in Burdle v Secretary of State for Environment [1972] 1 WLR 1207, should be distinguished from the “new planning unit” or “new chapter in the planning history” concept, which concerns whether implemented development or a planning condition is incompatible with pre-existing use rights.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2026] EWCA Civ 368: permission granted on grounds 1 and 2(3); appeal allowed on those grounds; enforcement notice appeal remitted to a different inspector for a fresh public inquiry.
• High Court, King’s Bench Division, Planning Court [2025] EWHC 883 (Admin): appeal under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 dismissed.
• Secretary of State’s inspector: enforcement notice upheld subject to extending the principal compliance period to seven months.