Ahmed, R (on the application of) v The National Probation Service & Anor

Licence conditions must be assessed as a package when deciding whether they deprive a person of liberty under Article 5. The length of a curfew is important, but it is not necessarily decisive. The practical effect of reporting, residence, movement and other conditions must be considered. Article 8 is engaged only where interference with private life reaches the required level of severity. A challenge to licence conditions need not be determined by a dedicated Parole Board procedure if judicial review provides an appropriate opportunity for challenge. Where the decision involves administrative judgment and expertise, limited judicial review may satisfy Article 6.

The claimant had been released on licence after serving half a determinate sentence for serious offences against his former wife. His licence required residence at a probation hostel, a night-time curfew and frequent reporting to hostel staff, together with restrictions on contact and geographical movement.

He claimed that the conditions infringed Articles 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and that the absence of a dedicated mechanism, such as a reference to the Parole Board, infringed Article 6. The conditions had progressively been relaxed by the time of the hearing. The central issues were whether the original package deprived him of liberty or seriously interfered with private life, and whether judicial review supplied an Article 6-compliant procedure.

1. Article 5. The court considered the combined effect of the curfew and reporting requirement, rather than treating the curfew period as decisive. The relevant question was whether the obligations were so destructive of the life the claimant might otherwise have led that they amounted to deprivation of liberty rather than restriction of movement.
2. The claimant had not shown that the reporting requirement prevented him from working in the family business. The evidence did not establish the nature, location or frequency of the work sufficiently to demonstrate that the requirement made it impossible. Even if it had prevented that work, the combination of the reporting requirement and curfew remained some way short of deprivation of liberty. The claimant could have provided more information to the Probation Service or sought work locally.
3. Article 8. The conditions did not prevent employment altogether. At most, they caused inconvenience in the claimant’s participation in the family business. That did not reach the minimum level of severity required to engage Article 8. The court nevertheless observed that the reporting requirement was authorised by the Criminal Justice (Sentencing) (Licence Conditions) Order 2005, and that monitoring the claimant’s whereabouts and restricting contact with his former wife provided a sufficient justification for the conditions.
4. Article 6. Whether licence conditions determine civil rights is case-specific and depends on their nature and effect. It was unnecessary to decide that issue because Article 6 was satisfied if the executive decision was subject to later control by a judicial body with full jurisdiction and the required guarantees.
5. The Probation Service’s decision involved an administrative judgment about how a prisoner should be managed during the remainder of his sentence, not merely determination of a simple disputed fact. Judicial review was therefore an adequate form of control. The absence of a prior opportunity to comment on the proposed conditions did not alter that conclusion, given the limited assistance the claimant could have provided on the risk of contact with his former wife.
6. The claim was dismissed in its entirety. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendants’ costs, subject to detailed assessment and the restrictions stated in relation to publicly funded costs.

First-instance judicial review claim. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.