The Vale of Glamorgan Council v The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Rev 1)

Where legislation confers broad powers to reorganise court accommodation and imposes no express consultation duty, the decision-maker may define the scope of consultation, subject to fairness. There is no general obligation to consult on every alternative means of achieving the proposed objective.

A decision-maker must have regard to legally mandatory considerations, but may determine the weight given to other relevant matters. The court must not substitute its own assessment of the merits or resource allocation unless the decision is irrational in the Wednesbury sense. After consultation, sufficient reasons must be given to explain the principal issues and why the decision was taken.

The claimant local authority sought judicial review of the Lord Chancellor’s decision, announced on 14 December 2010, to close Barry Magistrates’ Court and transfer its work to Cardiff. The challenge followed a national consultation concerning the closure of magistrates’ and county courts.

The claimant alleged that the consultation was unlawfully restricted, that relevant considerations had been ignored or given inadequate weight, that the decision was irrational, and that insufficient reasons had been provided. The court conducted a rolled-up hearing to determine both permission and the merits.

1. Permission and outcome. Permission to pursue the judicial review was granted, but the application was dismissed. The Lord Chancellor had committed no error of law.
2. Consultation. The Lord Chancellor was entitled to consult on proposed court closures without consulting on every possible alternative means of achieving increased utilisation or savings. Consultation is not negotiation. The scope of consultation was fair, particularly because consultees could suggest alternatives. There was no duty to undertake a further consultation on every alternative subsequently raised.
3. The suggested closure of Caerphilly had been addressed and rejected for rational administrative reasons, including its position in a different Local Criminal Justice Board area. The proposed sub-letting of Cardiff premises would not address Barry’s under-utilisation. The authorities concerning exceptional unfairness in Madden and Medway Council were distinguishable.
4. Relevant considerations and weight. The Lord Chancellor had considered the principal matters relied upon, including the quality and condition of Barry Court, recent expenditure, domestic-violence facilities, travel consequences and economic effects. The weight given to those matters was for the decision-maker. The court could intervene only if the overall decision was irrational.
5. The Lord Chancellor had considered the economic impact of closure and was not legally obliged to treat Barry’s designation as a Strategic Regeneration Area, or its possible civic symbolism, as mandatory material considerations. The approach in Creedenz, approved in In re Findlay and followed in Corner House Research, was applied.
6. Rationality and reasons. The anticipated savings and improved efficiency provided cogent reasons for closure. The decision was not one which no reasonable Minister could have made. Following consultation, reasons were required, but only sufficient reasons addressing the principal issues were necessary. The consultation material and impact assessments clearly explained the decision.