Minter, R (on the application of) v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary & Anor

An extended sentence under section 85 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 is a sentence of imprisonment for the aggregate of its custodial term and extension period. The whole term therefore determines the notification period under section 82(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The extension period cannot be excluded merely because it serves rehabilitative and protective purposes. The court was bound by R v Wiles, and treated R v Graham S as obiter and decided per incuriam. Convention arguments did not justify a different construction. The domestic rule of precedent also required the court to follow R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home Department on article 14.

The claimant had been convicted of sexual offences and received an extended sentence of four and a half years under section 85 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, comprising an 18-month custodial term and a three-year extension period.

The Chief Constable determined that the claimant was subject to indefinite notification requirements under section 82(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The claimant argued that only the custodial term counted, which would have produced a ten-year notification period. The central issue was whether the statutory reference to imprisonment for a term of 30 months or more included the extension period.

1. Claim dismissed. The extended sentence was a sentence of imprisonment for a term of four and a half years. The claimant was therefore subject to the notification requirements indefinitely under section 82(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
2. Section 85(2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 defines an extended sentence as a custodial sentence whose term is the aggregate of the custodial term and the extension period. Section 76(1) treats the relevant custodial sentence as a sentence of imprisonment. The extension period is therefore part of the term of the sentence, subject only to express statutory provisions directing otherwise.
3. The reasoning in R v Graham S did not bind the court. Its observations on notification were obiter, because the issue was not raised by the grounds of appeal and the Crown Court had no power to order the statutory notification period. The decision was subsequently held in R v Wiles to have been decided per incuriam. R v Wiles was materially applicable and binding, notwithstanding the later observations in H v The Queen.
4. The different purposes of the custodial and extension periods did not justify excluding the latter. The extension period assists in preventing further offences and securing rehabilitation, purposes connected with the notification requirements. The statutory language prevailed over the policy arguments.
5. The observations in R (Sim) v Parole Board concerned the Convention characterisation of detention during an extension period. They did not determine the statutory meaning of the term of an extended sentence for notification purposes.
6. The article 8 arguments failed. The statutory framework was sufficiently clear, and including the extension period was not inherently disproportionate. The article 14 argument also failed because the court was bound by R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. The later Strasbourg decision in Clift v United Kingdom did not permit departure from the domestic precedent.
7. The court expressed no concluded view on whether the extended-sentence provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 produced a materially different result.

First-instance judicial review in the Divisional Court of the High Court. The claim challenging the Chief Constable’s construction of the notification provisions was dismissed.