Hi-Lite Electrical Led v Wolseley UK Ltd

Where a claimant alleges that goods failed shortly after supply, the timing of the failure does not by itself establish breach of the implied term of satisfactory quality. The claimant retains the legal burden of proving the cause of the damage on the balance of probabilities. Where several possible causes exist, rejecting one explanation does not require the court to accept another if the evidence leaves the cause uncertain.

A failure by a contractor to install a recommended safety device may be a concurrent cause of loss, but it does not ordinarily remove the causative potency of a supplier’s breach of a strict contractual obligation. In the absence of a statutory or contractual basis for apportionment, damages cannot generally be apportioned merely by reference to competing causative conduct.

A fire originated in a submersible pump installed at a hair salon. Hi-Lite, the electrical contractor, had previously been held liable to the salon operator in separate proceedings. It then claimed an indemnity and declaration against Wolseley, the seller, alleging that the pump was not of satisfactory quality under section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Wolseley brought third-party proceedings against the manufacturer, Leader, now DAB Pumps SpA.

The principal issue was whether the cable failure resulted from a manufacturing defect or from damage during installation or service. The court also considered whether Hi-Lite should have installed a residual current device, whether it would have prevented the fire, remoteness, and apportionment.

1. Claim dismissed. The fire was caused by fatigue failure of the pump’s float-switch cable. On the balance of probabilities, the cable sheath had been cut by salon staff using a sharp instrument while cleaning hair and debris from the sump. Hi-Lite therefore failed to prove the alleged manufacturing defect, and Wolseley was not liable under section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The third-party claim against Leader consequently failed.
2. The court applied the approach in Rhesa Shipping v Edmunds (The “Popi M”) [1985] 1 WLR 948 and Alan Ide v ATB Sales Limited; Lexus Financial Services v Sandra Russell [2008] EWCA Civ 424. The claimant retained the legal burden throughout. A defendant’s alternative explanations did not shift that burden. The court was not compelled to choose between competing theories where the evidence was unsatisfactory.
3. Hi-Lite should have installed an RCD. The pump was connected to a fused spur without an isolation switch, and the manual recommended an RCD. Access to a live pump by untrained salon staff created an increased shock risk. On the balance of probabilities, gradual carbonisation would have produced earth leakage and caused the RCD to trip before ignition.
4. Had Wolseley been liable, the absence of an RCD would not have broken the chain of causation. The supplier’s breach would have remained an effective concurrent cause. Nor would fire damage, or sums paid by Hi-Lite for that damage, have been too remote.
5. There was no basis for apportionment. The strict contractual liability under section 14(2) could not be reduced by Hi-Lite’s negligence. Barclays Bank Plc v Fairclough Building Ltd [1995] QB 214 was applied, and the broader approach in Tennant Radiant Heat Ltd v Warrington Development Corp [1988] 1 EGLR 41 was confined to its particular facts.

First-instance proceedings. The judgment records separate Birmingham proceedings in which Hi-Lite had been found liable to Obsession, but those proceedings were not an appeal in this case. An application to treat the earlier factual findings as binding had previously been rejected by Burnett J.