Adelson & Anor v Anderson & Anor

A libel claim may be struck out as an abuse of process where the reputational interest at stake no longer justifies the court resources required for trial. The court may consider the gravity and age of the allegations, delay, evidence of repetition, the likely value of vindication and the availability of effective relief. A separate abuse may arise where the claimant has lost interest in bringing the proceedings to judgment. The absence of prejudice to the defendant does not prevent a strike-out based on disproportionate use of court resources. The enforceability of an English damages judgment abroad is not ordinarily relevant to that assessment.

The claimants sued over words published at a Labour Party Conference fringe meeting in September 2004. The substantive defences included qualified privilege, fair comment and justification. The defendants applied under CPR rule 3.4(2)(b), contending that prolonged delay, the claimant’s loss of interest and the limited practical value of continuing the action made it an abuse of process. The second claimant accepted that it had no cause of action. The court had to determine whether the first claimant’s claim should also be struck out, including whether the resources required for trial remained proportionate to what could be achieved by way of vindication.

1. The second claimant’s claim was struck out because it had no cause of action. The first claimant’s claim was also struck out under CPR rule 3.4(2)(b).

2. Following Jameel v Dow Jones [2005] QB 946, abuse of process may be established where the reputational interests at stake are disproportionate to the judicial and court resources needed to resolve the dispute. The absence of prejudice to the defendants was not decisive.

3. The court considered the first period of delay, exceeding fifteen months, unexplained. The second period, lasting about three years after settlement of related litigation, was largely unexplained. A reasonable period for mediation had to be allowed, but mediation could not justify most of the delay.

4. The court assessed the diminished practical value of a trial by reference to the age and context of the allegations, the absence of evidence of repetition, the claimant’s failure to identify continuing damage, the limited likelihood of an injunction, and the fact that qualified privilege might defeat the claim without producing a finding of falsity.

5. The court accepted the approach in Grovit v Doctor [1997] 1 WLR 640, as explained and applied in Icebird Ltd v Winegardner [2009] UKPC 24. It would also have struck out the first claimant’s claim because he had ceased, after March 2008, to intend to prosecute it to trial.

6. The possibility that an English judgment would be unenforceable in the United States was rejected as irrelevant. The application succeeded and the action was struck out.