Crossland v University of Glamorgan

In a defamation claim founded on qualified privilege, malice must be pleaded and evidenced against a person who was both malicious and responsible for the publication complained of. A person who supplied information is not jointly responsible for a later publication merely because the information may have initiated a chain of events. The claimant must identify the words allegedly supplied and show an arguable case that the later publication was a republication of those words or words to the same effect. Summary judgment or strike-out is appropriate where, taking the evidence at its highest, a jury could not properly find malice or responsibility for publication.

The claimant appealed against Master Leslie’s order striking out his libel claim and entering summary judgment for the defendant university. The claim concerned six publications describing his behaviour as aggressive, disruptive, threatening or abusive, made during discussions about his re-enrolment and the university’s internal complaints process. The claimant accepted that the publications were made on occasions of qualified privilege but alleged that the privilege was defeated by malice and improper purpose.

The appeal principally concerned whether Lyn Daunton, whose reports had prompted some of the later communications, was jointly responsible for their publication, whether there was an arguable case of malice, and whether the claims should also be struck out under the principle in Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones Inc [2005] QB 946.

1. Appeal and permission. The appeal was dismissed. Permission to enlarge the grounds of appeal was refused, and the relief sought in the claimant’s application notice was refused.
2. Responsibility for republication. A claimant seeking to defeat qualified privilege by relying on the malice of an intermediary must show an arguable case that the intermediary was responsible for the relevant publication and acted maliciously. It was insufficient that Ms Daunton had supplied information or that her communications may have initiated later discussions. The words in the challenged publications were materially different from the words she had used, and the later reports concerned principally the enrolment incident rather than the claimant’s earlier conduct at the Law School.
3. Malice. The claimant bore the burden of showing a realistic prospect of proving that the relevant publisher did not honestly believe the words published, or acted with a dominant purpose to injure him. Mere assertion, absence of supporting evidence, or disagreement with the characterisation of events was insufficient. The witness material provided a proper basis for the descriptions of the enrolment incident, and the allegations against the authors of the later reports were not properly particularised.
4. Summary disposal. Under CPR r.3.4(2) and r.24.2, the court may prevent a hopeless allegation of malice proceeding to trial where the evidence, taken at its highest, could not properly support a verdict for the claimant. The court applied the approach analogous to a submission of no case to answer described in R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039. The issues were straightforward, and there was no compelling reason for a trial.
5. The arguments based on improper purpose, inadequate notice, and complexity were rejected. Consultation about the effect of disability-discrimination legislation and possible lawful grounds for refusing admission did not itself establish an improper purpose. The application notice adequately identified the essential issue, and any procedural complaint could in any event be resolved consistently with the overriding objective.

1. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) [2011] EWHC 2809 (QB): appeal dismissed; permission to rely on additional grounds refused.
2. Master Leslie: claim struck out and summary judgment entered for the defendant. The decision is described in the present judgment but no separate citation is stated.