Cairns, R (on the application of) v HM Deputy Coroner for Inner West London & Ors

A coroner’s decisions in an inquisitorial inquest attract substantial supervisory latitude. The court reviews legality, fairness and rationality, rather than substituting its own view. Witness selection is governed by relevance and expediency, and intervention is justified only where the decision is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

An inquest is directed principally to identifying the deceased and determining how, when and where the death occurred. Its scope may extend further to consider possible verdicts or a prevention-of-future-deaths report, but decisions on that scope are rarely reviewable. A jury is required only where recurrence of the relevant circumstances is reasonably preventable or controllable. A fresh inquest ordinarily requires important new evidence capable of producing a different verdict.

Eilidh Cairns died after her bicycle collided with a heavy goods vehicle. Her sister applied for judicial review of the Deputy Coroner’s conduct of the inquest and sought to quash the verdict and obtain a fresh inquest.

The claimant challenged refusal to adjourn, failure to summon a jury, restrictions on questioning and the failure to make a prevention-of-future-deaths report. The central issues were the lawful scope of a coroner’s discretion and whether any challenged decision was irrational or otherwise unlawful.

1. Claim dismissed. The court considered each complaint separately and cumulatively, but found no unlawful decision or procedural error.
2. The court’s role was supervisory. It was not entitled to re-take the coroner’s decisions on evidence, witnesses or case management. The relevant question was whether the coroner acted within lawful limits and within the range of reasonable responses: Bradley v The Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 (QB), approved on appeal at [2005] EWCA Civ 1056.
3. Under section 11(2) of the Coroners Act 1988, witness selection involved relevance and expediency. The coroner’s decision was reviewable only for Wednesbury unreasonableness. The disclosure supplied shortly before the hearing did not justify an adjournment, particularly since the material was provided promptly and the claimant could identify no further necessary evidence.
4. The statutory purpose of an inquest was limited to determining who the deceased was and how, when and where the deceased came by death. Rule 36 of the Coroners Rules 1984 reinforced that limitation. The inquiry could extend further where necessary to consider possible verdicts or a Rule 43 report, but the coroner had primary control over that scope. The restrictions on questioning, including questioning engaging Mr Lopes’s privilege against self-incrimination, were lawful.
5. Section 8(3)(d) of the Coroners Act 1988 required a jury only where the relevant circumstances were capable of prevention or control by appropriate action. The evidence did not establish that the risk of collisions between cyclists and large vehicles could be averted in that sense. The case also lacked the unusual features present in R (Paul and Ritz Hotel Ltd) v Deputy Coroner for the Queen’s Household [2008] QB 172.
6. Rule 43 involved two discretionary decisions: whether the evidence gave rise to concern about future deaths and whether, in the coroner’s opinion, action should be taken; and, even then, whether to report the circumstances. The decision not to make a report was not Wednesbury unreasonable.
7. A fresh inquest would not ordinarily be ordered without important new evidence capable of producing a different verdict: Re Rapier [1988] QB 26. That threshold was not met.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The claim to quash the inquest verdict and obtain a fresh inquest was dismissed.