Bradley v Jockey Club

A court reviewing a contractual disciplinary decision exercises a supervisory jurisdiction. It asks whether the decision-maker acted lawfully and whether a proportionate penalty fell within the available discretionary area of judgment. The court does not determine the appropriate penalty afresh.

Professional and trade disciplinary bodies are ordinarily better placed to assess the importance of their rules and the seriousness of breaches. A penalty is not disproportionate merely because it prevents an offender from continuing in the chosen occupation. Where observance of professional rules is critical, exclusion from that occupation may be the only appropriate response to deliberate wrongdoing.

A former jockey challenged disciplinary proceedings brought by the Jockey Club after he admitted supplying privileged racing information for reward. Its Appeal Board upheld findings of serious breaches of the Rules of Racing but reduced his disqualification from eight years to five.

He claimed an injunction and damages for breach of contract, and alleged unlawful restraint of trade. Richards J dismissed the claim in [2004] EWHC 2164 QB. On appeal, the challenge to the judge's description of the court's jurisdiction as supervisory was abandoned. The remaining issue was whether the five-year disqualification was a disproportionate interference with the appellant's ability to work as a bloodstock agent.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Richards J had correctly described the court's jurisdiction over a domestic disciplinary decision as supervisory. The court examines whether the procedure was fair, whether an error of law occurred, and whether an exercise of judgment remained within the limits lawfully open to the decision-maker. It does not substitute its own assessment of the appropriate penalty: paras 17–18.

2. Proportionality requires a balance between competing considerations and may permit more than one lawful answer. A penalty is unlawful only when it falls outside the decision-maker's discretionary area of judgment or range of reasonable responses. Professional and trade regulatory bodies are ordinarily better placed than courts to assess the significance of breaches of their governing standards: paras 17 and 20.

3. The Appeal Board had considered the importance of maintaining racing's integrity, the seriousness and duration of the breaches, punishment, deterrence, prevention, mitigation, and the effect of disqualification upon the appellant and his family. It had correctly applied the proportionality criteria derived from De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69. Its conclusion that five years' disqualification was proportionate fell within the lawful range of judgment: paras 14–16 and 25.

4. A person entering an occupation that critically depends upon compliance with particular rules has no vested right to continue earning a living in it after deliberately breaking those rules. A tribunal must carefully consider whether exclusion from the occupation is required, but the destruction of the offender's existing business does not itself make the penalty disproportionate. Exclusion may be the only appropriate response: para 24.

5. Buxton LJ added that Nagle v Fielden concerned a general and discriminatory rule excluding a category of persons from a profession irrespective of conduct, competence or disciplinary record. It did not undermine otherwise lawful disciplinary action against a person admitted to a profession who then broke its rules: paras 29–31.

Order: Appeal dismissed, with costs awarded to the respondent.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal in [2005] EWCA Civ 1056 was dismissed unanimously. The court upheld Richards J's conclusion that the five-year disqualification was proportionate.

2. High Court: Richards J dismissed the claim for an injunction and damages for breach of contract in [2004] EWHC 2164 QB. He held that the court's jurisdiction was supervisory and that the Appeal Board's penalty was within its discretionary area of judgment.

3. Jockey Club Appeal Board: The Board upheld the material findings of misconduct, reduced the proven period of offending, and substituted five years' disqualification for the Disciplinary Committee's eight-year penalty.