BSD, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Naturalisation is discretionary. An applicant bears the burden of satisfying the Secretary of State that he is of good character, and the Secretary of State may adopt a demanding standard compatible with rationality. The court reviews the standard selected and its application only for legality and rationality; it does not conduct a merits appeal.

Where an applicant has previously been judicially found responsible for conduct engaging Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, the Secretary of State may take that finding into account. The decision-maker may also weigh the seriousness and duration of the conduct against remorse, rehabilitation and subsequent good character. A refusal based on participation in torture and support for an organisation involved in international crimes was within the statutory discretion.

BSD renewed an application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings challenging the Secretary of State’s refusal of his naturalisation application. Permission had previously been refused by HHJ Coe KC.

BSD had worked in KhAD in Afghanistan and had previously been excluded from Refugee Convention protection under Article 1F following findings that he had participated in torture amounting to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. He argued that the Secretary of State had failed to consider possible defences under the Rome Statute, the ICCPR, and evidence of remorse, rehabilitation and exemplary conduct in the United Kingdom.

The central issues were whether the Secretary of State had erred in law or acted irrationally in applying the good-character requirement and whether the court should interfere with the assessment.

1. Renewed application refused. The decision refusing naturalisation was lawful and rational. The claim did not disclose an arguable error of law or Wednesbury unreasonableness.
2. Under section 6(1) and paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 to the British Nationality Act 1981, the Secretary of State has a power, rather than a duty, to grant citizenship. The applicant must positively satisfy the Secretary of State that he is of good character. The Secretary of State has no discretion to waive that statutory requirement.
3. The assessment of good character is fact-sensitive. The Secretary of State may adopt a high standard, provided that the standard and its application are ones that could reasonably be adopted in the circumstances. The court’s task is supervisory and does not involve substituting its own view of the merits.
4. The Secretary of State was entitled to rely on the binding First-tier Tribunal findings, upheld on appeal, that BSD had been involved in torture and was properly excluded under Article 1F. The Secretary of State nevertheless considered the arguments concerning Article 33 of the Rome Statute and the surrounding evidence. There was no evidential basis for the asserted defence of grave, imminent and irremediable peril, and the chronology undermined the argument that BSD’s later conduct was compelled by his initial recruitment as a young person.
5. The Secretary of State was entitled to attach substantial weight to BSD’s long-term service in KhAD, advancement within that organisation, participation in torture, and referral of detainees for possible execution. Remorse, rehabilitation, honesty, lawful residence, employment and family life were considered, but did not constitute sufficiently strong countervailing factors.
6. The court reiterated that judicial review asks whether the decision-maker acted within lawful limits, applied the correct legal approach and reached a conclusion within the range of reasonable responses. The renewed application for permission was refused. Costs relating to the acknowledgment of service were reinstated, with no order for the costs of the renewal hearing.

First-instance judicial review permission decision. Permission had previously been refused by HHJ Coe KC in a decision sealed on 6 October 2025. The renewed application was refused by the High Court.