Williamson MP v Formby

An unincorporated association’s disciplinary rules form a contractual framework. Contractual powers must be exercised in good faith, fairly and rationally, subject to supervisory judicial review rather than a rehearing on the merits. Where an apparently final disciplinary decision has been communicated, the association may reopen the matter only for proper reasons, such as important overlooked evidence, procedural unfairness or an obviously wrong decision. Internal or press criticism is not, by itself, a proper reason. The court should defer to the association’s specialist assessment but must not simply rubber-stamp it. Fresh allegations may nevertheless be investigated and may justify a further suspension, provided the process is not shown on the evidence to be unfair or in bad faith.

The claimant was a Member of Parliament and member of the Labour Party. He was suspended pending investigation of allegations that his conduct had brought the Party into disrepute. On 26 June 2019, an NEC Disputes Panel found misconduct but issued a formal warning rather than referring the matter to the National Constitutional Committee. Following substantial internal and public criticism, the Party decided on 9 July that the decision could not safely stand and referred the case to the NCC on 19 July.

The claimant sought declarations and injunctive relief concerning the reopening and referral of the original case. He also challenged a further suspension imposed on 3 September 2019 in respect of new allegations. The central issues were whether the Party was entitled to reopen an apparently final disciplinary decision and whether the later investigation and suspension were unlawful.

1. Contractual framework. The relationship between the Labour Party and its members was governed by the law of contract. The contract was found in the Party’s rules, whose construction was a matter for the court. Contractual powers and discretions had to be exercised in good faith and not arbitrarily, capriciously or irrationally. The court’s function was supervisory, not to substitute its own disciplinary judgment.
2. Power to reopen. The Party had power to approve or reject a panel decision and, where the original decision was flawed, to reopen the case. That power had to be exercised fairly and in good faith. Where a panel decision had been communicated in unequivocal terms as final, the Organisation Committee should not decline to approve it, and the Party should not reopen the case for referral to the NCC without proper reasons.
3. The court should accord due deference to the Party’s internal process, but deference did not permit mere rubber-stamping. Proper reasons could include overlooked important evidence, procedural unfairness or an obviously wrong decision. A breach of confidentiality, internal reaction or adverse press coverage was not, without more, a proper reason for reopening an otherwise procedurally fair and rational decision. The Party had relied on no adequate reason. It had therefore acted unfairly in reopening and referring the original case. Declaratory relief was granted.
4. The later allegations were genuinely new and there was evidence that they had been investigated before being put to the claimant. The court would not lightly interfere with the Party’s decision to investigate or suspend pending investigation, and a Part 8 hearing on the papers was unsuitable for determining alleged improper motives. Relief concerning the second suspension was refused, and the new disciplinary case was to run its course.