Waterson v Lloyd & Anor

In determining the meaning of allegedly defamatory election publications, the court must reach its own conclusion as to what the words would convey to the hypothetical reasonable reader. The publications must be read as a whole and in context, including headlines, surrounding material and any apparent distinction between news and comment. A defamatory imputation framed through factual assertions remains a statement of fact, even where evaluative language such as “scandal” or “abuse” is used. A publisher may criticise lawful use of a statutory or administrative scheme as opinion, but must make that distinction clear. Where the defendant relies only on comment and does not plead truth, a finding that the words are defamatory statements of fact entitles the claimant to judgment on liability.

The claimant, a former Member of Parliament, sued his successor and the successor’s agent over two election publications distributed in Eastbourne. The publications described his expenses claims, his family home outside the constituency and an alleged expenses scandal. The defendants applied for summary judgment, contending that the words were honest comment on a matter of public interest. The claimant sought judgment on liability, arguing that the publications conveyed factual allegations that he had abused the Parliamentary expenses rules. The central issues were the meaning of the publications and whether they conveyed statements of fact or comment.

1. Meaning. The court must determine for itself the meaning conveyed by the publications. The hypothetical reasonable reader is assessed under the principles in Jeynes v News Magazines Limited, including reasonableness, reading the publication as a whole and taking the surrounding context into account. The court is not required to choose between the parties’ competing meanings.
2. The publications would reasonably be understood to allege that the claimant was guilty of abusing the Parliamentary expenses rules for his own financial advantage. The references to the amounts claimed, the location of the home and the repeated descriptions of scandal and abuse were not confined to criticism of the mere existence of the expenses scheme.
3. The words were plainly defamatory and were statements of fact. The publications did not distinguish factual assertions from comment or opinion. A publisher could have stated that the expenses scheme was itself scandalous, acknowledged that the claims were lawful and then expressed an opinion that making them was nevertheless wrong. The defendants had not achieved that distinction.
4. The principles governing fair comment, restated in Spiller v Joseph, did not require determination because the court found that the words were factual allegations and the defendants had not pleaded truth. Since the publications were defamatory statements of fact, summary judgment was entered for the claimant on liability. Damages or other relief were left to be determined separately if not agreed.

First-instance decision. No prior or appellate decision is stated in the judgment.