Palmer v Lawrence

For a spouse’s claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants Act) 1975, reasonable financial provision is assessed by a value judgment under the statutory factors. Maintenance is relevant but is not the sole criterion. The applicant must first establish that the will fails to make reasonable provision; only then does the court exercise its discretion as to the provision to be made.

Hypothetical divorce provision is only one factor. Where the parties kept their finances separate and their assets pre-dated the relationship, an equality cross-check may have little value. Litigation costs should not create a claim where the will otherwise makes reasonable provision.

The claimant, the deceased’s widow, applied under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants Act) 1975. The will gave her life interests in two English properties worth £405,000 and distributed the remainder of the estate, including a Jamaican property, among other beneficiaries.

The issue was whether that provision was reasonable in all the circumstances, having regard to the claimant’s resources and needs, the estate, the beneficiaries, the parties’ financial independence and the provision that might have been made on divorce.

1. Claim dismissed. The claimant failed to establish that the will did not make reasonable financial provision. The court therefore had no discretion to alter the testamentary provision.
2. A spouse has standing under sections 1 to 3 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants Act) 1975. Reasonable financial provision means provision that it would be reasonable for a spouse to receive, whether or not required for maintenance. The applicant bears the burden of proving that the will failed to provide it.
3. The assessment under section 3 is a value judgment, not an exercise of discretion. The court must consider the relevant statutory factors, including resources and needs, the size and nature of the estate, obligations, disability and other relevant matters.
4. The impact of litigation costs should be considered consistently for both the claimant and the estate. Where reasonable provision exists before costs are considered, a self-induced costs burden cannot make it unreasonable.
5. The hypothetical divorce comparison under section 3(2)(b) is relevant but not determinative. The equality approach associated with White v White was of little assistance because the parties’ assets pre-dated their relationship and their financial affairs remained separate.
6. The claimant’s life interests gave her substantial control over the properties and enabled her to meet her income shortfall by letting or selling property. The deceased was under no obligation to house his wife’s adult daughter.