John Lewis Partnership v Charman

Ignorance of the time limit for an unfair dismissal claim may make it not reasonably practicable to present the claim within time, provided the ignorance was itself reasonable. The existence of an internal appeal does not create an automatic extension and is not, by itself, a rule of law making tribunal proceedings impracticable. It is a factual circumstance relevant to whether the claimant could reasonably have been expected to investigate legal proceedings and discover the time limit. A tribunal’s conclusion on reasonable practicability is consequently difficult to challenge on appeal. After the relevant obstacle ends, the claim must be presented within a reasonable period, assessed in light of all the circumstances, including the claimant’s actual knowledge.

The claimant was summarily dismissed on 13 March 2010 and pursued an internal appeal. The appeal was dismissed by letter sent on 28 June. He presented an unfair dismissal complaint on 21 July, after the primary three-month period under section 111(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 had expired.

The Watford Employment Tribunal held that it had not been reasonably practicable to present the claim before the internal appeal was determined and that the claim was presented within a reasonable further period under section 111(2)(b). The employer appealed both findings. The central issues were whether the claimant’s ignorance of the time limit was reasonable and whether he acted with reasonable expedition thereafter.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the unfair dismissal complaint.
2. Under section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, a claimant who is reasonably ignorant of the relevant time limit cannot be said to have found it reasonably practicable to comply with that limit. The crucial further question is whether the ignorance was reasonable. It would not be reasonable if the claimant ought reasonably to have made inquiries which would have revealed the time limit.
3. The existence of a pending internal appeal is not, by itself, sufficient to establish that presenting a tribunal complaint was not reasonably practicable. The issue remains one of fact. The appeal may nevertheless be relevant to whether a claimant could reasonably be expected to investigate legal recourse immediately after dismissal.
4. Bodha and Palmer did not require a different result. Those cases concerned applicants who knew, or through skilled advisers were treated as knowing, the applicable time limits and who deferred proceedings merely because an internal appeal was pending. They did not decide whether it was reasonable for an unrepresented claimant to remain unaware of the time limit while awaiting an internal appeal.
5. The claimant was young and inexperienced, and neither he nor his father knew the time limit. It was not perverse for the Tribunal to conclude that it was reasonable to await the internal appeal before making inquiries. The Tribunal was also entitled to regard the claimant’s ignorance as relevant when deciding whether he acted within a reasonable further period. Once he learned of the adverse appeal decision, he acted promptly and presented the claim within days.
6. The reasoning in Ashcroft depended on the regime introduced by Part 3 of the Employment Act 2002. Following its abolition on 6 April 2009, the law reverted to its previous position.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: appeal from the decision of Employment Judge Ryan, Watford Employment Tribunal, sent to the parties on 14 January 2011. Appeal dismissed.