Blitz v Vectone Group Holdings Ltd (Revised 1)

An Employment Tribunal may distinguish between a protected disclosure and the manner in which it is made. Employers may act on genuinely separable misconduct, such as poor judgment, inappropriate conduct or an intemperate method of communication, but tribunals should recognise that distinction cautiously.

A protected disclosure does not itself establish that a subsequent dismissal was because of the disclosure. The claimant must prove the statutory reason for dismissal, subject to the applicable burden of proof. Employment Tribunals may assess hearsay evidence flexibly and are not bound to apply the detailed criteria in the Civil Evidence Act 1995.

Under section 130 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, a continuation order preserves pay and benefits but does not prescribe the method of payment.

The Claimant appealed against an Employment Tribunal decision following a seven-day hearing. The Tribunal dismissed claims that he had been automatically unfairly dismissed for making protected or health and safety disclosures, but upheld limited detriment claims concerning late salary and expense payments.

The Claimant had made disclosures about health and safety, legal compliance and financial practices during a short period of employment. He challenged the Tribunal’s reliance on an uncalled witness’s statement, its findings about the reason for dismissal, its treatment of protected disclosures, and its construction of a continuation of contract order under section 130 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

The central issues were whether the Tribunal had lawfully evaluated the evidence, whether the dismissal was because of protected disclosures, and what obligations a continuation order preserved.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Tribunal had made primary findings supported by sufficient evidence and had given adequate reasons.
2. Under rule 14(2) of the Employment Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, the Tribunal was not bound by ordinary judicial rules governing admissibility of evidence or by the detailed criteria in section 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. It was entitled to receive and weigh an untested witness statement, provided it assessed reliability in the context of all available material. Here the statement was considered alongside contemporaneous documents, the Claimant’s own evidence and accepted minutes.
3. The Tribunal was entitled to find that the dismissal was caused by dissatisfaction with the Claimant’s performance, poor judgment and loss of trust, rather than by his protected disclosures. The fact that disclosures had been made, and that dismissal followed, did not establish causation.
4. The email of 5 September did not disclose information because it sought advice without asserting facts showing a breach. The later communications contained qualifying disclosures, but the Tribunal was entitled to distinguish the disclosures from the manner in which they were made. The Respondent’s complaint was found to concern the Claimant’s conduct and judgment, including his inappropriate communications and premature resignation of directorships.
5. Section 130 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 continued pay and benefits and continuity of employment. It did not continue a contractual obligation to pay by bank transfer or empower the Tribunal to prescribe the payment method. Payment had to reach the Claimant by the due date. Late payment could constitute both breach of the continuation order and actionable detriment.
6. BUPA cover was a benefit preserved by section 130 even though the qualifying period had not expired, although no protected-disclosure causation was established. Travel insurance did not give rise to detriment because no qualifying business travel occurred.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the appeal from the Employment Tribunal’s decision.
• Employment Tribunal: dismissed the automatic unfair dismissal claim, upheld limited detriment claims, and adjourned wage-deduction and payslip issues.