Moore v The President Of The Methodist Conference

A minister’s spiritual vocation does not, without more, prevent an employment contract from arising with a religious organisation. The question is assessed objectively from the whole relationship. An appointment to a specific post for a defined period, with identified duties and provision for remuneration, accommodation, expenses or leave, may display an intention to create legal relations.

The reasoning in President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt, insofar as it treated the spiritual nature of ministerial work as sufficient to negate contractual intention, could not be sustained after Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland. Contractual status remains fact-sensitive. Spiritual duties, autonomy and religious discipline are relevant considerations, but they do not by themselves exclude a contract of service.

The claimant was an ordained Methodist minister appointed for five years as superintendent minister of a circuit. The Methodist Church’s constitutional rules provided for her duties, stipend, accommodation, leave, sick pay, pension and disciplinary arrangements. She resigned after proceedings were commenced to curtail her appointment and brought a claim for unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996.

The Employment Tribunal dismissed the claim, considering itself bound by President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt to find that no contract of employment existed. The central issues were whether Parfitt remained binding after Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland, and, if not, whether the claimant worked under a contract of service.

1. Appeal allowed. The Employment Tribunal had erred in treating Parfitt as binding and dismissing the claim on the basis that the claimant had no relevant contract. The case was remitted to the Employment Tribunal to determine the unfair-dismissal claim on its merits.
2. Percy established that the relationship between a minister and a church must not be approached with a presumption that there was no intention to create legal relations. The reasoning of Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale on this point formed part of the authoritative ratio of Percy, adopted by Lord Scott.
3. The essential reasoning in Parfitt was that the spiritual nature of a minister’s role, supported by related features such as the nature of the stipend and resignation arrangements, negated contractual intention. Once the general presumption based on spiritual status was disapproved in Percy, the same reasoning could not sustain the result in Parfitt, even on materially similar facts.
4. Examined objectively, the claimant’s appointment involved an offer and acceptance of a specific church post for five years. The governing rules supplied sufficiently identifiable duties and terms concerning stipend, expenses, holiday and accommodation. Those features were contractual in character.
5. The contract was a contract of service. The claimant received regular remuneration, sick pay and accommodation; participated in appraisal; was subject to supervision and discipline; and was required to be available for working time while retaining professional discretion. The absence of fixed hours and the spiritual character of the work did not prevent that conclusion.
6. Article 9 of the Convention did not prevent the finding. No evidence established that contractual employment of ministers was contrary to Methodist doctrine. The Tribunal would not, in any event, be required to adjudicate disputed questions of doctrine merely by determining employment status.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Appeal allowed. The decision was remitted to the Employment Tribunal for determination of the unfair-dismissal claim on its merits.
• Employment Tribunal: Claim dismissed on the ground that the claimant was not employed under a contract of service within section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.