The Director of Public Prosecutions v AA Bholah (Mauritius)

For a money-laundering offence, the prosecution need not identify or prove the particular predicate crime that generated the property. It is sufficient to establish that the property represented the proceeds of criminal activity and that the accused had the required suspicion or reasonable grounds for suspicion. The constitutional right to be informed of the charge concerns the nature of the money-laundering offence, not proof of a specific underlying crime. Fairness may nevertheless require particulars of the type of criminal activity alleged to have generated the proceeds where that information can feasibly be given.

The respondent was convicted by the Intermediate Court of Mauritius of transferring property contrary to sections 17(1)(b) and 19 of the Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2000. The magistrate held that the prosecution did not have to identify or prove the particular crime from which the money derived.

The Supreme Court of Mauritius quashed the conviction. It held that section 17(7) was repugnant to section 10(2)(b) of the Constitution because the predicate crime had to be particularised and proved. The central issue was whether a specific predicate offence had to be identified and proved, and what fairness required as to particulars of the alleged criminal activity.

1. Appeal allowed. The Board, delivering judgment through Lord Kerr, restored the magistrate’s decision.
2. Section 17(1)(b) of the Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2000 requires proof that the property represented the proceeds of any crime, together with the accused’s relevant suspicion or reasonable grounds for suspicion. The reference to any crime is non-specific. Proof that a particular offence generated the property is unnecessary.
3. Failure to identify and prove a specific predicate offence therefore did not breach section 10(2)(b) of the Constitution. The accused had to be informed of the nature of the offence charged, namely money laundering. A particular predicate crime was not an essential element of that offence.
4. Fairness remained important. Where possible, the prosecution should provide particulars of the type of criminal activity said to have generated the proceeds. Section 17(7) did not prevent a request for those particulars or relieve the prosecution of the obligation to supply them where able to do so.
5. The information might not originally have complied with section 125(1) of the District and Intermediate Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act. Any deficiency was cured by the conduct of the proceedings and the respondent’s pre-trial interviews. He and his advisers understood that the allegation concerned the illegal procurement of transfers from Mr Nunez’s account. The trial was therefore fair.

• Privy Council: appeal from the Supreme Court of Mauritius allowed; the magistrate’s conviction was restored.
• Supreme Court of Mauritius: conviction quashed on the grounds that section 17(7) was repugnant to section 10(2)(b) of the Constitution and that adequate particulars had not been provided.
• Intermediate Court of Mauritius: respondent convicted on 21 September 2004.