Craig, R. v

For offences concerning criminal property under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the prosecution need prove that the property was a benefit from criminal conduct. It need not prove one identified offence, or require the jury to agree on a particular route by which the property became criminal property.

A trial judge must present the defence case clearly, coherently and by reference to the counts. This is especially important in a money-laundering prosecution, where the defence evidence may explain an apparent disparity between income and assets. A deficient summing-up which prevents the jury from properly evaluating that case renders the convictions unsafe.

The appellant was convicted at Exeter Crown Court of using, transferring and possessing criminal property, contrary to the money-laundering provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. He received a total sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment.

The prosecution relied on the disparity between his declared income and his substantial cash expenditure, bank deposits and assets. The appellant said that his funds derived from legitimate but undeclared work, trading, property dealings and accumulated savings. On appeal, he argued that the jury should have been required to agree on the specific criminal conduct that made the property criminal property, and that the judge had failed to sum up the defence coherently.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed the convictions on counts 1 to 4 because the summing-up did not fairly present the defence case. A retrial was ordered.

2. The proposed direction based on R v Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115 was not required. Under section 340 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the jury had to be sure that the property was criminal property and that the required knowledge or suspicion was proved. The statutory definition is deliberately general. It does not require proof of a particular offence or type of criminal conduct from which the property derived. The court approved the statement in R v Kelly that no such further requirement is imported by the Act.

3. However, a judge conducting a jury trial must lay the defence before the jury clearly and intelligibly. The requirement was particularly important here because the offences were widely drawn and the appellant’s evidence and that of his witnesses were central to his explanation of the money and bank transactions.

   The summing-up did not provide a coherent account of the defence, either generally or count by count. It largely rehearsed prosecution evidence, gave only cursory treatment to important defence evidence, and omitted two defence witnesses altogether. Although the prosecution case was strong, the court could not regard the verdicts as safe because the appellant had not received a fair trial.

4. As non-dispositive guidance, where a count alleging use or possession of criminal property is framed widely, the prosecution should ordinarily give full particulars of the items said to be criminal property, either in the indictment or before the jury is addressed. This assists in preventing an unnecessarily wide-ranging trial.

5. The court directed a retrial on a fresh indictment, re-arraignment within two months, and determination of the retrial venue by the Presiding Judge for the Western Circuit.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2007] EWCA Crim 2913, allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions on counts 1 to 4, and ordered a retrial on a fresh indictment.
• Exeter Crown Court — On 18 December 2006, convicted the appellant of using, transferring and possessing criminal property. On 19 December 2006, imposed a total sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment.